United States of America v. Candace Sue Thein, also known as Candace Sue Cummings

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1551
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Candace Sue Thein, also known as Candace Sue Cummings
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
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Submitted: April 13, 2026
Filed: June 16, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before KELLY, ARNOLD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Candace Thein pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute a
controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846, and one count
of distributing a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and

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the district court1 imposed consecutive sentences of 240 months in prison for
conspiracy and 52 months for distribution. She appeals.
At sentencing, the district court considered Thein’s attempt to collect on a
drug debt while “she was clearly aware law enforcement officers were onto her.”
Thein now claims that, while the interaction “was over a monetary debt,” there was
no evidence “that indicated the debt was drug related.” But she did not object to the
PSR’s factual allegation that the debtor was one of her methamphetamine customers.
See United States v. Zayas, 758 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2014) (district court may
rely on unobjected to factual allegations in the presentence report). The district court
did not plainly err when it inferred that a debt owed to Thein by a methamphetamine
customer was related to drugs. See United States v. Cottrell, 853 F.3d 459, 462 (8th
Cir. 2017) (standard of review where defendant failed to object to the alleged error).
Thein next argues the district court should have varied down because law
enforcement seized only marijuana from her. But Thein admitted that she
voluntarily and intentionally joined the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
and sold methamphetamine to another person. She does not challenge the drug-
weight calculation and acknowledges she can be held responsible for any drugs
foreseeably distributed as part of the conspiracy. See United States v. Vinton, 429
F.3d 811, 817 (8th Cir. 2005); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The district court
properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including Thein’s involvement
in the conspiracy, which imported large amounts of ice methamphetamine, so it did
not abuse its considerable discretion “in declining to vary downward.” United States
v. Kobriger, 825 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2016).
Thein also claims that her criminal history was driven by drug addiction and
the district court should have given that consideration more weight. But it’s clear
the district court did consider how her drug addiction influenced her conduct and
1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa.

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weighed it against her participation in the conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The
court explained that Thein was not just “sell[ing] enough meth to meet her own
personal needs, but she was in this for making profit off of it.” The district court did
not abuse its discretion when it decided “to assign some factors more weight than
others.” United States v. Sharkey, 895 F.3d 1077, 1083 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
Similarly, Thein argues the district court should have given weight to the fact
that her original criminal history category was increased based on United States v.
Syphax, 127 F.4th 746 (8th Cir. 2025), a case decided after her presentence report
was prepared. See id. at 748 (explaining how to calculate criminal history points for
multiple revocations). Assuming this is a mitigating factor, the district court did
consider it and “simply [could not] conclude . . . [Thein’s] criminal history category
of VI overstates significantly in any way the seriousness of her criminal history or
the likelihood of her reoffending.”
Finally, the district court acted within its “discretionary authority to order
sentences to run consecutively rather than concurrently.” United States v. Valure,
835 F.3d 789, 790 (8th Cir. 2016). It properly considered the § 3553(a) factors when
it imposed consecutive sentences, finding that “while there may be some mitigating
factors here, there’s also significant aggravating factors.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3584
(directing district court to consider the § 3553(a) factors in deciding “whether the
terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively”).
Affirmed.
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