United States of America v. Jason Kale Clampit

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1611
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jason Kale Clampit
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville
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Submitted: May 15, 2026
Filed: June 24, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant Jason Clampit pled guilty to one count of possession of a prohibited
biological weapon, namely ricin,1 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 175(b). The district
1 Ricin is “a toxin derived from the castor bean plant [that] is extremely
deadly.” United States v. Baker, 98 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1996). We have

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court2 sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised
release. Clampit now appeals, arguing that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the sentence.
I.
In January 2024, Arkansas police officers received a phone call from Joy
Uribe, Clampit’s half-sister, who reported a possible ricin poisoning. Uribe told
police that Clampit had poisoned his mother with ricin and that Clampit’s mother
was hospitalized.
Uribe later sent screenshots of Clampit’s text messages to the FBI in which
Clampit admitted that he had produced ricin, including a “mixture . . . made of ricin
water and lye,” to “set up traps” for trespassers. Ricin toxin can be extracted from
castor beans, then purified and dissolved in water to be released as a liquid. When
law enforcement searched Clampit’s residence pursuant to a search warrant, they
found castor beans and seeds, seeds in a paper towel, a jar with liquid, and a .22
caliber revolver.
Shortly after, Clampit was arrested. While he was incarcerated, investigators
overheard Clampit instructing his girlfriend Linda Hussong to take the jars of liquid
found in his house and “throw it all away”; he later told her again to “go in there and
make sure everything is empty.”
A federal grand jury charged Clampit with one count of developing,
producing, stockpiling, transferring, acquiring, retaining, or possessing a biological
agent for use of a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (Count 1) and one count
previously acknowledged evidence that “about .7 gram of 5% pure ricin . . . [could
be] enough to kill 126 people.” Id.
2 The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas.

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of possession of a biological agent, namely ricin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 175(b)
(Count 2). Clampit pled guilty to Count 2 pursuant to a written plea agreement, and
the district court dismissed Count 1 on motion of the Government. Following the
plea agreement, and prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared
a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that calculated an advisory imprisonment
range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines of 77 to 96 months.
At sentencing, the Government argued that an upward variance from the
Guidelines range was warranted. The Government stated that the ricin discovered
in the case was “enough to kill everybody in this courthouse,” and that it was “the
most deadly substance [it had] ever discussed . . . in this Court.” It further argued
that “there[] [is] no legitimate purpose” to have ricin “other than [as] a weapon.”
The Government also pointed to Clampit’s lengthy criminal history, arguing that it
“paint[ed] a picture that [he] is dangerous [and] has been dangerous to the
community for a long time.”
Clampit opposed the Government’s request for an upward variance. While
acknowledging that his criminal history was an aggravating factor with regard to his
sentence, Clampit pointed out that he was a “polysubstance addict most of his
life”—starting as early as the age of 10—which “affect[ed] his maturation and
decisionmaking.” Clampit also noted that he was physically and sexually abused at
a young age, and that he had mental health issues such as depression, anxiety, and
hallucinogen use disorder. Clampit ultimately concluded that “a guideline sentence
is fair because it[] balanc[es] his criminal history [and] . . . the circumstances of the
case,” suggesting a sentence that “fall[s] somewhere in that middle [or] maybe a
little bit towards the serious end” of the Guidelines range. Clampit later reiterated
to the district court that “a guideline sentence gets it right.”
The district court, weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, imposed a
top-of-the-Guidelines sentence of 96 months. Recognizing the deadly nature of
ricin, the district court noted that “[w]ith regard to . . . the relative seriousness of the
offense, this case is singularly unique.” The district court further found that, at least

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at some point, Clampit intended “to use the substance that [he] knew [was]
lethal . . . to cause harm to others,” which was an “extremely aggravating” factor.
The district court also expressed concern that Clampit was “instructing others . . . to
go destroy evidence,” and that he was a felon with nearly “two convictions per year
of [his] adult life,” some of which included domestic abuse and attempted first-
degree battery.
However, the district court also discussed several mitigating factors. It
recognized that Clampit had a tumultuous upbringing, mental health issues, and an
early exposure to drugs, all of which it “certainly view[ed] . . . as mitigating.” Thus,
while the district court noted that the aggravating factors “could make a pretty easy
case for the Court to vary upward,” it stated that it was “not going to do that,” and it
instead imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 96 months. Clampit appeals.
II.
“When we review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the
Guidelines range, we apply ‘a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United
States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted).
We “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
error.” Id. (citation omitted). “In the absence of procedural error below, we ‘should
then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Clampit’s sole argument on appeal is that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. In reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, “we are to
‘take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any
variance from the Guidelines range.’ If the defendant’s sentence is within the
Guidelines range, then we ‘may . . . apply a presumption of reasonableness.’” Id.
(citations omitted). “[I]t will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court
sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as
substantively unreasonable.” Id. at 464 (citation omitted). Additionally, as we have

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frequently stated, “a sentencing court has wide latitude to weigh the section 3553(a)
factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others.” United
States v. Roberts, 747 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Thus, “a
defendant’s disagreement with the district court’s balancing of relevant
considerations does not show that the court abused its discretion.” United States v.
Campbell, 986 F.3d 782, 800 (8th Cir. 2021).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Clampit’s
sentence. For one, the sentence is presumptively reasonable because it falls within
the Guidelines range. See Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461. The district court also
thoroughly considered the factors enumerated in § 3553(a). It considered Clampit’s
lengthy criminal history, the “singularly unique” dangerousness of a substance like
ricin, and the fact that he instructed another person to help him destroy evidence.
The district court also considered factors favorable to Clampit, such as his difficult
upbringing, drug abuse history, and mental health issues. Additionally, finding an
abuse of discretion here would be particularly unreasonable given Clampit’s own
statements at sentencing that “a guideline sentence gets it right” and “is fair.”
Clampit nonetheless argues that the district court abused its discretion because
it “should have given more weight” to the fact that he had been addicted to
substances since his youth, had mental health issues, and was sexually abused as a
child. But the district court specifically considered these facts in imposing his
sentence, and it expressly acknowledged their mitigating impact. Indeed, these
mitigating factors were what influenced the district court to impose a
within-Guidelines range, despite its finding that the aggravating factors of Clampit’s
conduct “ma[d]e a pretty easy case for the Court to vary upward.” Thus, because
Clampit’s contention is merely a “disagreement with the district court’s balancing
of relevant considerations,” Campbell, 986 F.3d at 800, we hold that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in imposing Clampit’s sentence.

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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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