United States of America v. Jacob Logan Stone

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1802
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jacob Logan Stone
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith
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Submitted: May 15, 2026
Filed: July 7, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before LAVENSKI R. SMITH, BENTON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Jacob Logan Stone pled guilty to one count of distribution of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and 2252(b)(1). The district
court1 sentenced him to 150 months in prison and a lifetime of supervised release.
1 The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Arkansas.

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Stone moved pro se for early termination of supervised release. The district court
denied the motion. He appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this
court affirms.
Stone believes the court should have granted him early termination of
supervised release because he “fully complied with all conditions for over four years,
completed treatment with a low risk of recidivism, maintained stable employment,
and reintegrated into society.” This court reviews the denial of a motion for early
termination of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Norris,
62 F.4th 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2023).
“Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court may, after considering certain
factors, terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant if it is
satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and
the interest of justice.” United States v. Mosby, 719 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2013).
The district court has “broad discretion” because “it is in the best position to evaluate
the circumstances of each individual defendant.” Id.
The district court explicitly stated that it considered “factors set forth under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable.” Noting both the probation
office and government’s opposition to the request, it reiterated “that the nature of
Defendant’s offense, which went beyond simply receiving child pornography but
also distributing it, is more severe than most sex offenders.” It noted that Stone “has
an extensive history of possessing, distributing, and producing child pornography,
along with direct personal offenses against minors.” And it agreed with the
government that Stone’s “characteristics render the lifetime of supervised release
necessary to protect the public, reflect the seriousness of Defendant’s offenses, and
deter future offenses.” The district court did not abuse its discretion. See id. (holding
that the court is not required to “explain its denial of early termination of supervised
release”).

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The judgment is affirmed.
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