United States of America v. Darnell L. Clemons

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-2333
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Darnell L. Clemons
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: July 16, 2026
Filed: July 21, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before LOKEN, L.R. SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Darnell Clemons appeals after he pleaded guilty to carjacking, ammunition, and
firearms offenses, pursuant to a plea agreement containing an appeal waiver. His
counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal after

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thoroughly reviewing the record. In a pro se supplemental brief, Clemons raises
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.
After de novo review, we will enforce the appeal waiver. See United States v.
Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (standard of review); United States v. Andis,
333 F.3d 886, 889-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). First, Clemons’s statements to the
district court1 at the change-of-plea hearing contradict any suggestion that he
unknowingly or involuntarily entered into the plea agreement or appeal waiver, as he
testified under oath that he understood the maximum potential penalties and the terms
of the plea agreement and appeal waiver; he was fully satisfied with counsel; he had
no questions; no one had promised or predicted what sentence he might receive; and
no one had forced, threatened, or coerced him to plead guilty. See Andis, 333 F.3d
at 890-91; Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997). To the extent
he claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in connection with the plea
and other aspects of his proceedings, we conclude those claims are more appropriate
for collateral review. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27
(8th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Griffin, 668 F.3d 987, 989-91 (8th Cir.
2012). Second, Clemons’s implicit pro se challenges to the sentencing calculations
fall within the scope of the appeal waiver, and his claims of prosecutorial misconduct
both fall within the scope of the waiver and were otherwise waived by pleading
guilty. See Scott, 627 F.3d at 704; United States v. Cain, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352-53
(8th Cir. 1998). Third, no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the
appeal waiver. See Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702, 1708, 1713-14 (2026);
Andis, 333 F.3d at 891-92. Finally, having independently reviewed the record under
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we have found no non-frivolous issues for
appeal outside the scope of the appeal waiver.
1The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri.
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Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver, and we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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