MICHAEL SCANTLIN and ORA SCANTLIN v. General Electric Company

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL SCANTLIN and ORA
SCANTLIN,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-55812
D.C. No. 5:10-cv-00333-VAP-OP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 6, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN, IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The district court entered judgment as a matter of law for the defendant, finding
no proof that an alleged product defect caused the plaintiff’s injury. We vacate the
judgment and remand for a new trial.
FILED
FEB 21 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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1. Michael Scantlin was badly burned when an industrial switchboard exploded;
he sued General Electric (“GE”), the switchboard manufacturer. Scantlin contended
that the explosion occurred when he was working in a safe area and leaned against a
metal barrier, which flexed and contacted a live busbar in the “hot” section of the
switchboard. GE contended that Scantlin had negligently lowered a metal hook and
chain into the “hot” section, contacting the live busbar.
Scantlin offered the expert testimony of Dr. Armstrong, an electrical engineer.
The court allowed Dr. Armstrong to opine that the hook and chain did not cause the
explosion. However, the court precluded Dr. Armstrong from testifying that contact
between the barrier and the busbar caused the explosion because the expert had not
performed any testing concerning the flexibility of the barrier. After Scantlin rested
his case-in-chief, the district court granted GE judgment as a matter of law, finding
insufficient evidence that the explosion was caused by contact between the metal
barrier and the busbar.
2. There is no dispute that Dr. Armstrong was “qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education” in the field of electrical
engineering, see Fed. R. Evid. 702, or that his opinion about the cause of the explosion
would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence,” see id. 702(a). Dr.

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Armstrong’s report documented that after reviewing and performing tests on the
physical evidence, consulting photographs of the equipment, and reading deposition
testimony, he had concluded that there were but two possible causes of the explosion:
either the metal barrier flexed and touched a live busbar or the chain and hook touched
a busbar. These were also the only causes suggested by the parties in the pretrial
statement.
Dr. Armstrong ruled out the chain and hook as a possible cause, and the district
court allowed him to so testify. Having correctly concluded that Dr. Armstrong’s
testimony on this issue was “the product of reliable principles and methods,” see id.
702(c), the court erred as a matter of law in precluding him from testifying that
contact between the barrier and the busbar must therefore have been the cause.
Because Dr. Armstrong scientifically determined that only two causes were possible
and “ruled out” one of the two, the district court should have allowed Dr. Armstrong
to testify that the remaining possibility (i.e., contact between the barrier wall and the
busbar) was in fact the cause. See Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1057
(9th Cir. 2003). The absence of testing on the barrier is a proper subject for
cross-examination, but did not preclude the expert from offering his opinion. See Fed.
R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note on 2000 Amendments (“[T]he trial court’s

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role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.”
(quoting United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)).
We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial.

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