Susan Kassebaum v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is*
substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent**
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without***
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUSAN KASSEBAUM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting*
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-35998
D.C. No. 6:08 cv-0433-HO
MEMORANDUM**
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael R. Hogan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 5, 2013***
Portland, Oregon
Before: TASHIMA, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
FILED
MAR 27 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Susan Kassebaum appeals from the district court’s partial denial of her
motion for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28
U.S.C. § 2412. She also appeals the district court’s denial of punitive fees under §
2412(b) for the alleged bad faith arguments of the Commissioner of Social
Security. Because the facts are known to the parties, we do not recite them here.
We affirm.
1. A district court has significant discretion to determine the amount of
a reasonable fees award, and to reduce a requested award to such an amount. See
Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990) (“[A] district court will always
retain substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award.”). It must,
however, articulate a “concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee” that
it ultimately awards. Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). Here, the
district court explanation, although not “elaborate,” was “comprehensible.”
Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007). The district
court’s reasoning was sufficient to “show [its] work when calculating attorney’s
fees,” Padgett v. Loventhal, 706 F.3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013), and thus was not
an abuse of discretion. See Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1148.

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2. We reverse a district court’s finding that a party did not act in bad
faith only where it is clearly erroneous. Beaudry Motor Co. v. Abko Prop., Inc.,
780 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1986). A district court should impose punitive awards
for bad faith only “in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice.”
Rodriguez v. United States, 542 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, the district court’s refusal to award punitive fees for bad
faith was not clearly erroneous. See id. at 710-11.
AFFIRMED.

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