Richard Roy Scott v. KELLY CUNNINGHAM, Superintendent

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD ROY SCOTT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
KELLY CUNNINGHAM, Superintendent,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-35737
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05509-BHS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 16, 2013**
Before: CANBY, IKUTA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Richard Roy Scott appeals pro se from the district court’s order imposing
monetary sanctions and judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action with
prejudice for failure to comply with the sanctions order. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s
FILED
APR 23 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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entry of monetary sanctions, Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d
644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997), and its sanction of dismissal of the case with prejudice,
Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing monetary
sanctions because the record supports its conclusion that Scott knowingly filed
duplicative and frivolous motions. See Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958
(9th Cir. 2006) (district court’s bad faith findings are reviewed for clear error);
Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district court has the
inherent authority to impose sanctions for bad faith, which includes a broad range
of willful improper conduct.”); Batarse, 115 F.3d at 649 (bad faith finding is
warranted where litigant “knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or
argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Scott by
dismissing his case with prejudice because the court warned Scott that failure to
comply with the sanctions order would result in dismissal, and Scott’s frivolous
and duplicative motions needlessly disrupted the litigation and burdened the court
and opposing counsel. See Leon, 464 F.3d at 961 (“[W]e do not disturb the district
court’s choice of sanction unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the

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district court committed a clear error of judgment[.]” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir.
1991) (setting forth the factors for determining whether to dismiss for failure to
comply with a court order and finding no abuse of discretion where three of the
five factors weighed strongly in favor of dismissal).
We reject as unpersuasive Scott’s contentions regarding his motion for
voluntary dismissal, the signing of the dismissal order, and alleged judicial bias.
AFFIRMED.

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