United States of America v. STEWART WILLIE JONES, AKA Stewart Jones

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEWART WILLIE JONES, AKA
Stewart Jones,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-50193
D.C. No. 8:12-cr-00259-DOC-2
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ISRAEL CARRILLO-LEAL,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-50197
D.C. No. 8:12-cr-00259-DOC-1
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 16, 2014
FILED
JUL 21 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

-- 1 of 4 --

Pasadena, California
Before: NOONAN and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and SILVER, Senior District
Judge.**
Appellants Stewart Willie Jones and Israel Carrillo-Leal (“Defendants”)
appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to suppress on grounds that the
emergency exception applied to law enforcement’s search of Defendants’ boat
(“the McYacht”). We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de
novo. United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
To determine whether the emergency exception applies, we look to see
whether “(1) considering the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had an
objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to
protect others or themselves from serious harm; and (2) the search’s scope and
manner were reasonable to meet the need.” United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947,
952 (9th Cir. 2008). The fact that an emergency does not ultimately materialize has
no bearing. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009).
The emergency exception applies in this case. The boat was circling in the
harbor, its bow riding low in the water, and smoke emanating from its cockpit. The
deputies therefore had an objectively reasonable basis to conclude assistance was
** The Honorable Roslyn O. Silver, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
2

-- 2 of 4 --

needed to prevent immediate injury to the individuals on board. The fact that
Deputy Martin relied on his experience in making this assessment does not detract
from this conclusion. A deputy’s training and experience can be taken into account
under the “objectively reasonable” standard. Cf. United States v. Cervantes, 219
F.3d 882, 888-91 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Officer Yergler knew from his training that
methamphetamine labs are volatile and therefore reasonably feared that Apartment
3 could explode at any moment.”), abrogated on other grounds by Brigham City,
Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006). Further, it is not necessary that law
enforcement are responding to an emergency call to fall within the emergency
exception. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir.
2010) (applying the emergency exception to search that was initiated after law
enforcement spoke to three illegal aliens who said they had recently escaped from
subsequently searched house). And merely because Defendants denied an
emergency existed did not render the search unreasonable. See, e.g., Fisher, 558
U.S. at 46; United States v. Doble, No. 08-50044, 2009 WL 567995, at *1 (9th Cir.
Mar. 6, 2009).
The manner and scope of the search were also reasonable. Deputy Martin
first announced himself over the PA before boarding the McYacht and limited his
search to the places he reasonably believed water had entered the hull of the boat.
3

-- 3 of 4 --

Until he saw a tattooed arm sticking out from behind the curtain, Deputy Martin
searched no other part of the boat aside from the hatches. He did not open cabinets
or search Defendants’ persons. He looked exclusively in the areas he believed the
source of the danger was likely to be found. The search was therefore “confined to
the areas of the [boat] likely to include individuals in harm’s way.” Snipe, 515 F.3d
at 954. Finally, the McYacht is a relatively small boat, and Deputy Martin could
see the “extreme list” of the boat and smoke billowing from the cockpit. It was
therefore reasonable for Deputy Martin to continue his search when he did not
initially observe water or damage in the first hatch he searched. Cf. United States v.
Deemer, 354 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2004) (“While the police may have thought
there was an emergency somewhere in the motel, it is a large motel and there were
insufficient facts to create a nexus between that possible emergency and room 404
to find a warrantless search of the room constitutional.”) (emphasis added).
Finding the emergency doctrine applies to law enforcement’s search of the
McYacht, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
4

-- 4 of 4 --