United States of America v. Luis Ricardo Pulido

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LUIS RICARDO PULIDO,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-10049
D.C. No. 5:13-cr-00016-RMW-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 12, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, M. SMITH, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of speedy trial rights
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, a court must first determine whether “the
interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary
FILED
MAY 04 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,
651–52 (1972) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–31 (1992)).
Once the defendant makes a showing of presumptively prejudicial delay,
the court must weigh four factors: (1) “the extent to which the delay stretches
beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim,”
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652; (2) “the reason the government assigns to justify the
delay,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; (3) “[w]hether and how [the] defendant asserts his
right . . . ,” id.; and (4) “prejudice to the defendant,” id. at 532.
After concluding that the presumption of prejudice may have been triggered
in this case, the district court weighed only two of the Barker factors: the prejudice
to the defendant and the length of delay. The district court erred in failing to weigh
the other two factors. See id. at 533. It was particularly important in this case that
the district court make a finding regarding the government’s reason for the delay.
Pulido alleged that the San Jose U.S. Attorney’s Office acted pursuant to a policy
of depriving state prisoners of their ability to assert speedy trial rights in § 1326
cases. This allegation, if credited, would weigh heavily in the Barker analysis. See
id. at 531 (“A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the government.”).
We vacate and remand to the district court with instructions to weigh each of
the Barker factors.

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VACATED AND REMANDED.

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