United States of America v. BRUCE WAYNE EAGLEMAN, Jr.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRUCE WAYNE EAGLEMAN, Jr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-30306
D.C. No. 1:12-cr-00032-SEH-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 7, 2015 **
Portland, Oregon
Before: W. FLETCHER and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges and BAYLSON,*** Senior
District Judge.
Defendant Bruce Eagleman, Jr. drove while severely intoxicated, swerved
into the wrong lane, and killed four people. Defendant pled guilty to second
FILED
MAY 20 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Michael M. Baylson, Senior District Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

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degree murder under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1153(a). On the eve of sentencing,
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, but the district court denied his
motion. The district court sentenced Defendant to 405 months. Defendant
challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, and the district court’s
decision not to apply a sentencing reduction based on his acceptance of
responsibility. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
“We review the district court’s denial of [a] motion to withdraw [a] guilty
plea for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir.
2010). “We review de novo the sufficiency of a Rule 11 plea colloquy.” United
States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008).
Defendant argues that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea because his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis,
as shown by the Rule 11 colloquy. We disagree. Although Defendant was
confused about malice aforethought, he later agreed that he acted with malice when
the term was explained. Further, even if Defendant may have decided to plead in
part because he did not trust his court-appointed lawyer, “being forced to choose
between unpleasant alternatives is not unconstitutional.” United States v.
Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, his plea was factually
supported. While Defendant disagreed with two facts contained in the Offer of
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Proof, Defendant agreed with enough of the facts to establish that he committed
second degree murder.
“Whether a defendant has accepted responsibility is a finding of fact
reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Melvin, 91 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir.
1996). “Due to the sentencing judge’s unique position in evaluating a defendant’s
acceptance of responsibility, ‘the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled
to great deference and should not be disturbed on review unless without
foundation.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 5).
A defendant is entitled to a sentencing reduction if he clearly demonstrated
acceptance of responsibility for his offense. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Defendant twice
pled guilty, but also twice moved to withdraw his pleas on the eve of sentencing.
Looking at this history, the district court decided that Defendant’s “repeated efforts
to avoid responsibility, strongly suggest to this court that [he has] a willingness to
malinger or take actions that attempt to avoid responsibility. . . . [He] strung this
case out for literally years, with first one activity or another, in what can only be, in
retrospect, characterized as an effort to avoid responsibility.” This conclusion was
not clear error.
AFFIRMED.
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