United States of America v. Jeremy White

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEREMY WHITE,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-10242
D.C. No. 3:14-cr-0020-WHO-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Horsley Orrick III, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 13, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: CLIFTON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges and LAMBERTH,*** Senior
District Judge.
FILED
JUN 20 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Royce C. Lamberth, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

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Jeremy White was convicted after a jury trial of one count of possession
with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of methamphetamine. He appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence of drugs found on his
person and in his car following a traffic stop and subsequent parole search. He also
appeals the denial of his Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm the district court’s denial
of both motions.
Officer Sedgwick had reasonable suspicion to stop White’s car. The
reasonable suspicion standard requires the officer to demonstrate an awareness of
“specific, articulable facts which, when considered with objective and reasonable
inferences, form a basis for particularized suspicion.” United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (emphasis in original).
Sedgwick credibly testified that one of White’s headlamps was emitting blue light,
in violation of the California vehicle code. Cal. Veh. Code § 25950(a). Although
California law, through the incorporation of the relevant federal standards, permits
the use of headlamps that emit white light closer to the blue end of the color
spectrum, 49 C.F.R. § 571.108, Sedgwick’s testimony was sufficiently specific to
justify the stop. Sedgwick expressly stated during cross-examination that the light
he observed was “blue” and not “bluish white.”
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The stop was justified even were Sedgwick mistaken either as to the precise
color of the light or the exact scope of California traffic laws. “[A] mere mistake of
fact will not render a stop illegal, if the objective facts known to the officer gave
rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” United States v.
Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). Nor does an officer’s reasonable
mistake of law invalidate the existence of reasonable suspicion. Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
There was also sufficient evidence to support White’s conviction. So long as
“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt” we must affirm the conviction. United States v. Nevils,
598 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (emphasis in original). “To sustain a
conviction for possession with intent to distribute . . . the government must prove
that the defendant (1) knowingly, (2) possessed the [drug], (3) with intent to
distribute it.” United States v. Magallon-Jimenez, 219 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir.
2000). The drugs in question were located in the hood of a car owned by White and
while White was driving. These facts alone allowed the jury to infer White’s
possession of the methamphetamine. Cf. United States v. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d
1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1991) (there was no evidence of possession where the
defendant “did not have a key to the trunk or car, was not driving the car, [and] did
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not own the car”). White’s statement during the traffic stop before the search of his
car that “now I’m going to jail” provided additional support for the jury’s finding.
Finally, White’s knowledge of and intent to distribute the drugs could be inferred
from their quantity and value. See United States v. Davila-Escovedo, 36 F.3d 840,
843 (9th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED.
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