Laura Toriello v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAURA TORIELLO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-16431
D.C. No.
2:13-cv-00653-LDG-VCF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Lloyd D. George, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 8, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: BERZON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,***
Chief District Judge.
FILED
JUL 22 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, United States Chief District
Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

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Laura Toriello appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Toriello’s application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) determined at step four of the five-step evaluation process that
Toriello was not disabled, because her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) did not
prevent her from performing her past relevant work. “We review the district
court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social security benefits de novo, and
reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
1. The ALJ’s determination that Toriello was capable of performing her past
relevant work was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ assessed Toriello’s
RFC as allowing her to perform “light work.” Even if we were to conclude that the
ALJ’s interpretation of one of the medical records was questionable, the ALJ’s
conclusion that she could perform light work was still adequately supported. See
Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).
Several medical evaluations indicate that Toriello (1) could lift and carry ten
pounds frequently and could lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally, and (2) in
an eight-hour workday, could stand or walk for six hours and could sit for six
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hours. The record is consistent with the requirements necessary to perform light
work. See SSR 83-10 (noting “a job is in this category when it requires a good
deal of walking or standing”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Toriello previously
engaged in light work.1 The record contains no medical evidence that would
compel us to reject the ALJ’s RFC and find that Toriello cannot perform her past
relevant work; at best, one of the medical evaluations does not provide enough
information to tell whether the evaluator thought she could. Therefore, the ALJ’s
conclusion that Toriello could perform past light work was not an abuse of
discretion.
2. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Toriello’s
symptom testimony. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001).
The ALJ properly discounted Toriello’s testimony regarding her disability and
capacity to work, because her statements were inconsistent with her activities of
daily living and the objective medical evidence. For example, the ALJ found
Toriello’s testimony that she was unable to stay on her feet for more than “half an
1 Toriello argues that she cannot perform the duties of a waitress. However,
Toriello previously engaged in light work in other employment areas. She
challenges those other areas for the first time on appeal as employment that was
not “substantial gainful activity.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574. Because Toriello did
not raise this argument to the district court, it is waived. See Greger v. Barnhart,
464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006).
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hour” and could not sit for more than fifteen minutes, along with her allegations in
her function report that she had difficulty lifting, bending, standing, reaching,
walking, sitting, remembering, and concentrating, to be inconsistent with her
admission that she “dusted, occasionally walked her dogs, read, used the computer,
and played games,” as well as “performed personal care tasks, prepared meals,
performed light chores, drove a car, shopped, handled money, . . . and socialized
with friends.” The ALJ also found these claims to be inconsistent with the
objective medical evidence. Notably, neither Toriello’s primary care physician nor
her chiropractor indicated any issues with her ability to walk or stand, and
Toriello’s claims of walking difficulties conflicted with both medical examiners’
findings, which included that she had a “normal gait,” did not use assistive devices,
and was able to walk and stand for at least six hours in an eight-hour day. Finally,
despite Toriello’s claims regarding the severity of her impairments, she received
conservative treatment.
AFFIRMED.
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