Frank Varela, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated v. Lamps Plus, Inc.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FRANK VARELA, on behalf of himself
and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LAMPS PLUS, INC.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 16-56085
D.C. No.
5:16-cv-00577-DMG-KS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 12, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, FERNANDEZ, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Lamps Plus appeals an order permitting class arbitration of claims related to
a data breach of personal identifying information of its employees. After Lamps
Plus released his personal information in response to a phishing scam, Frank
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
AUG 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Varela filed a class action complaint alleging negligence, breach of contract,
invasion of privacy, and other claims. Lamps Plus moved to compel bilateral
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement (“the Agreement”) it drafted and
required Varela to sign as a condition of his employment. The district court found
that the Agreement is a contract of adhesion and ambiguous as to class arbitration.
It construed the ambiguity against the drafter, Lamps Plus, and compelled
arbitration of all claims, allowing class-wide arbitration to proceed.
On appeal, Lamps Plus argues that the parties did not agree to class
arbitration. We disagree, and affirm the district court.
“[A] party may not be compelled under the [Federal Arbitration Act] to
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the
party agreed to do so.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 684 (2010). The parties agree that the Agreement includes no express mention
of class proceedings. However, as the Supreme Court stated, “silence” in its Stolt-
Nielsen analysis constituted more than the mere absence of language explicitly
referring to class arbitration; instead, it meant the absence of agreement. 559 U.S.
at 687 (“[W]e see the question as being whether the parties agreed to authorize
class arbitration.”); see also Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064,
2069-70 (2013). There, the Supreme Court accepted the parties’ stipulation that

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silence meant “there’s been no agreement that has been reached . . . .” 559 U.S. at
668-69. That the Agreement does not expressly refer to class arbitration is not the
“silence” contemplated in Stolt-Nielsen.
We apply state law contract principles in order to interpret the Agreement.
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). In California,
a contract is ambiguous “when it is capable of two or more constructions, both of
which are reasonable.” Powerine Oil Co. v. Super. Ct., 118 P.3d 589, 571 (Cal.
2005). Contracts may be ambiguous as a whole despite terms and phrases that are
not themselves inherently ambiguous. See Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 139
P.3d 56, 60 (Cal. 2006). Ambiguity is construed against the drafter, a rule that
“applies with peculiar force in the case of a contract of adhesion.” Sandquist v.
Lebo Auto., Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2016).
At its outset, the Agreement contains a paragraph outlining Varela’s
understanding of the terms in three sweeping phrases. First, it states Varela’s
assent to waiver of “any right I may have to file a lawsuit or other civil action or
proceeding relating to my employment with the Company.” Second, it includes an
additional waiver by Varela of “any right I may have to resolve employment
disputes through trial by judge or jury.” Third, “arbitration shall be in lieu of any
and all lawsuits or other civil legal proceedings relating to my employment.” A

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reasonable – and perhaps the most reasonable – interpretation of this expansive
language is that it authorizes class arbitration. It requires no act of interpretive
acrobatics to include class proceedings as part of a “lawsuit or other civil legal
proceeding[].” Class actions are certainly one of the means to resolve employment
disputes in court. That arbitration will be “in lieu of” a set of actions that includes
class actions can be reasonably read to allow for class arbitration.
This construction is supported by the paragraph below these broad
statements, captioned “Claims Covered by the Arbitration Provision.” The first
sentence contemplates “claims or controversies” the parties may have against each
other, which Lamps Plus argues supports purely binary claims. Yet Varela’s claims
against the company include those that could be brought as part of a class. The
Agreement then specifies that arbitrable claims are those that “would have been
available to the parties by law,” which obviously include claims as part of a class
proceeding. The paragraph lists a non-limiting, vast array of claims covered by the
arbitration provisions, including many types of claims for discrimination or
harassment (“race, sex, sexual orientation . . .”) that are frequently resolved
through class proceedings. See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez,
431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977) (“[S]uits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often
by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs.”); Griggs v. Duke

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Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The paragraph concludes by excluding from the
Agreement two types of claims, but not any class or collective proceedings.
Moreover, a class action is “a procedural device for resolving the claims of
absent parties on a representative basis” rather than a separate or distinct “claim.”
Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 435 (9th Cir. 2015). The
broad language of the Agreement is not limited to claims. Varela surrendered his
right to bring all “lawsuit[s] or other civil action[s] or proceeding[s].” (emphasis
added). Additionally, the Agreement authorizes the Arbitrator to “award any
remedy allowed by applicable law.” Those remedies include class-wide relief.
Because the Agreement is capable of two reasonable constructions, the
district court correctly found ambiguity. State contract principles require
construction against Lamps Plus, the drafter of the adhesive Agreement. By
accepting the construction posited by Varela – that the ambiguous Agreement
permits class arbitration – the district court properly found the necessary
“contractual basis” for agreement to class arbitration. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at
684.
We AFFIRM and VACATE the stay of arbitration.

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Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., No. 16-56085
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because, as I see it, the Agreement was not ambiguous.
We should not allow Varela to enlist us in this palpable evasion of Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684–85, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775, 176
L. Ed. 2d 605 (2010).
FILED
AUG 03 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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