Heydi Chavez-Paez v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HEYDI CHAVEZ-PAEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 13-70780
Agency No. A088-891-797
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Heydi Chavez-Paez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for the
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal
from an immigration judge’s decision denying her application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 13-70780
(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo
questions of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except
to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s determination of the governing
statutes and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004).
We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Silaya v.
Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny in part and grant in part
the petition for review, and we remand.
The record does not compel the conclusion that Chavez-Paez established
extraordinary or changed circumstances to excuse her untimely asylum application.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.4(a)(4), (5). Thus, we deny the petition as to asylum.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Chavez-Paez failed to establish it is more likely than not she would be tortured by
or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador.
See Silaya, 524 F.3d at 1073.
As to withholding of removal, the BIA did not have the benefit of Barajas-
Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the “one central
reason” standard applies to asylum but not withholding of removal). In addition,
when the agency found that Chavez-Paez failed to demonstrate the harm she
suffered and fears were on account of a protected ground, it did not have the
benefit of this court’s decisions in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th

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Cir. 2013) (en banc), Cordoba v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013), and Pirir-
Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014), or the BIA’s decisions in Matter of
A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014) (“married women in Guatemala who
are unable to leave their relationship” can constitute a cognizable social group),
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014), and Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I.
& N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). Thus, we grant the petition for review and remand
Chavez-Paez’s withholding of removal claim to the agency for further proceedings
consistent with this disposition. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002)
(per curiam).
Each party shall bear its own costs for this petition for review.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part;
REMANDED.

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