RICK MURPHY, DBA Pinnacle Management Group v. Acw Cbp Maine LLC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICK MURPHY, DBA Pinnacle
Management Group,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ACW CBP MAINE LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 16-16048
D.C. No. 4:15-CV-00238-FRZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frank R. Zapata, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 20, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,*** Judge.
Rick Murphy (“Murphy”) appeals from the district court’s summary judgment
in favor of ACW CBP Maine LLC (“ACW”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
FILED
OCT 24 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without argument.
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.

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U.S.C. § 1332. We review the summary judgement de novo, construing the facts and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Earl v. Nielsen
Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011).
1. The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of ACW on
Murphy’s breach of contract claim. The parties agree Maine law governs this action.
Section 13004 of Maine’s Real Estate Brokerage Licensing Act, Me. Stat. tit. 32, §
13004, precludes a party from maintaining an action for a real estate broker’s fee,
unless the party is a licensed real estate broker in Maine. Because Murphy did not
prove licensure in Maine, he is precluded from maintaining this action.
2. The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of ACW on
Murphy’s unjust enrichment claim. Section13004 prohibits maintaining “any action,”
including equitable actions, for recovery of broker’s fees. Because Murphy did not
prove his licensure in Maine, his equitable claim is “statutorily barred.” See Smith v.
Cannell, 723 A.2d 876, 880 (Me. 1999) (emphasis original).
3. Murphy’s argument that section 13004 only bars him from bringing an
action in Maine state court, but not elsewhere, is incorrect. Section 13004 is Maine
substantive law, and so a federal court sitting in diversity applies that law as a
Maine state court would apply it. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415, 426–28 (1996). Thus, because Murphy’s claim would be barred in
2

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Maine state court, it is barred in federal court as well. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[W]here a federal court is exercising
jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so
far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a
State court.”).
AFFIRMED.
3

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