ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, AKA Roberto M. De Guzman, AKA Roberto Mercardo De Guzman v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, AKA Roberto
M. De Guzman, AKA Roberto Mercardo De
Guzman,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 14-73167
Agency No. A205-285-644
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Roberto De Guzman, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo due process challenges to an order of
removal. Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny
in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
We lack jurisdiction to consider De Guzman’s contentions regarding the
validity of the plea agreements in his criminal cases because these contentions
function as an impermissible collateral attack upon his convictions. See Ramirez-
Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that petitioner
could not collaterally attack his state court conviction on a petition for review of a
BIA decision).
Similarly, the BIA did not err in citing to Matter of Madrigal, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 323, 327 (BIA 1996), to state that a collateral attack on his convictions in
removal proceedings does not affect the finality of them for immigration purposes.
See Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Matter of
Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 850, 854-55 (BIA 2012) (alien’s conviction
remained effective for immigration purposes in the absence of vacatur by the state
court, even based on a contention that the requirements of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356 (2010), were not met, because it is well settled that the agency cannot
entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments).
We reject De Guzman’s contention that the BIA violated due process in
dismissing his appeal in a decision by a single member, where his notice of appeal

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did not present a circumstance warranting review by a three-member panel. See
Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 2003) (“it does not
violate the Due Process Clause for one member of the BIA to decide an alien’s
administrative appeal.”).
We lack jurisdiction to review De Guzman’s unexhausted contentions
regarding whether CW-1 status constitutes “entry” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A),
whether the federal immigration laws were permissively retroactively applied to
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”), that the IJ failed to
consider the transition of federal immigration control in the CNMI, that the IJ
failed to properly consider his pro se status, and that the IJ arbitrarily changed his
ruling regarding voluntary departure. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080
(9th Cir. 2010) (the court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented in
proceedings before the agency).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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