Naeem Ahmad v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NAEEM AHMAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS INC; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 13-17309
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01331-MCE-
CKD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Naeem Ahmad appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging federal claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ahmad’s Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (“RESPA”) claims concerning disclosures because any such claim
was barred by the statute of limitations, and because there is no private right of
action for violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2603(b). See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (statute of
limitations); Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 598 F.3d 549, 557 (9th
Cir. 2010) (no private right of action under 12 U.S.C. § 2603).
The district court properly dismissed Ahmad’s RESPA claims concerning
Bank of America’s failure to respond to Ahmad’s Qualified Written Request
(“QWR”) because Ahmad failed to allege facts sufficient to show he suffered
damages as a result. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1) (explaining damages available
under RESPA for failure to respond to a QWR). The district court properly
dismissed Ahmad’s additional QWR-related RESPA claims because Ahmad failed
to allege facts sufficient to show he sent any other QWRs to defendants acting as
loan servicers. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (QWR statute limited to loan servicers).
The district court properly dismissed Ahmad’s Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims related to actions defendants took in connection
with commencing a non-judicial foreclosure of Ahmad’s property because “actions

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taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure . . . are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as
that term is defined by the FDCPA.” Ho v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 858 F.3d 568,
572 (9th Cir. 2017).
The district court properly dismissed Ahmad’s FDCPA claims against
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., American Pacific Mortgage Corp., ReconTrust
Co., N.A., and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. because Ahmad
failed to allege facts sufficient to show these defendants were “debt collectors”
within the meaning of that statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6) (defining a “debt
collector” as one who “regularly collects . . . debts owed . . . or due another” and
excluding those collecting “a debt which was not in default at the time it was
obtained by such person”).
The district court properly dismissed Ahmad’s FDCPA claims against Bank
of America, N.A. and Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC because Ahmad failed to
allege facts sufficient to show these defendants used any “false, deceptive, or
misleading . . . means in connection with the collection of a debt,” or otherwise
violated any provision of the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (prohibiting false,
deceptive, or misleading means in connection with collection of a debt);
§ 1692g(a)(3) (providing 30 day period for consumer to dispute a debt).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting Ahmad leave to
file a second amended complaint. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp., 232 F.3d 719, 725-
26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district
court “acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be
futile”); Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (district
court’s discretion “particularly broad” when it has already granted a plaintiff leave
to amend).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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