United States of America v. Felicidad Rivera

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FELICIDAD RIVERA,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10301
D.C. No. 1:16-cr-00598-SOM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Susan O. Mollway, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Felicidad Rivera appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges
the 35-month sentence imposed following her guilty-plea convictions for 13 counts
of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 18 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 17-10301
Rivera contends that the district court erred by applying a vulnerable victim
enhancement under U.S.S.G § 3A1.1(b)(1). She argues that the victim’s dyslexia
and friendship with Rivera did not make the victim particularly vulnerable because
these circumstances did not make it easier to defraud her. We review the district
court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 229 (2017).
The record reflects that the victim had been diagnosed with dyslexia. She
told the district court at sentencing that she transposed numbers and needed help
managing her financial affairs, and that she became close friends with Rivera, her
bookkeeper, during the course of their professional association. The record further
shows that Rivera was repeatedly able to defraud the victim for several years
without detection. The district court’s determination that this combination of
circumstances showed that the victim was “particularly susceptible to the criminal
conduct,” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 n.2, was not “illogical, implausible, or without support
in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record,” United States v.
Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Therefore, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in applying the vulnerable victim enhancement.
AFFIRMED.

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