Sulakhan Singh v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SULAKHAN SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
Nos. 15-72259
16-70119
Agency No. A077-823-351
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 18, 2018**
San Francisco, California
Before: N.R. SMITH and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and LYNN,*** Chief
District Judge.
FILED
MAY 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concluded that this case was suitable for
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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Sulakhan Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) (1) denying his first motion
to reopen based on materially changed circumstances and (2) denying his second
motion to reopen based on materially changed circumstances and ineffective
assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the
petition for review.
1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s first motion to
reopen based on materially changed circumstances. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381
F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004). Singh failed to establish a material change of
circumstances in India that would establish that he could not internally relocate.1
Although Singh presented credible evidence that the police continue to look for
him in his home village, he failed to present evidence that he would be persecuted
in the locations the BIA identified that he could reasonably relocate.
2. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s second motion to
reopen based on materially changed circumstances and ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2003). Singh did
not present sufficient evidence of materially changed circumstances to establish he
1 Singh admits in his opening brief that there was insufficient evidence to
grant the first motion to reopen.
2

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could not internally relocate. None of his submitted documents suggest that the
government is looking for Singh outside of his village. Singh presented no
evidence of an individualized threat to persecute him outside of his village that
would establish a prima facie case. Thus, Singh’s prior counsel’s failure to address
internal relocation in the first motion to reopen was not prejudicial.
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.
3

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