Michael Victory v. Board of Parole Hearings;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL VICTORY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-15953
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00997-WBS-
CKD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Michael Victory appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims in
connection with his parole hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Wilhelm
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 20 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Victory’s as-applied challenges to his
parole hearing because Victory failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the
parole hearing denied him due process, including “an opportunity to be heard and
[] a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562
U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (a federal due process claim in parole context requires only
that prisoner be provided with an opportunity to be heard and a statement of the
reasons why parole was denied); see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82
(2005) (a prisoner may challenge procedures used in parole hearing under § 1983
provided he does not seek “immediate or speedier release”).
The district court properly dismissed as barred by the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine Victory’s claim alleging legal errors in his California state habeas
proceeding. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155-57 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rooker–
Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeal of a state court decision).
The district court properly dismissed Victory’s claim against the state-court
clerk defendants because these defendants are protected by absolute quasi-judicial
immunity. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987)
(court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights

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violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 881 F.3d 679,
690 (9th Cir. 2018) (standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Victory’s action
without further leave to amend. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would
be futile).
Victory’s motion to supplement exhibits (Docket Entry No. 17) is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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