United States of America v. Muhammed Tariq Camran

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MUHAMMED TARIQ CAMRAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-50404
D.C. No.
3:17-cr-00817-CAB-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 12, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: IKUTA and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and McNAMEE,*** District
Judge.
Muhammed Tariq Camran appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion to suppress evidence stemming from a vehicle stop on the basis that the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Stephen M. McNamee, Senior United States District
Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUL 30 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 17-50404
border patrol agent lacked reasonable suspicion to direct the stop. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not err in denying Camran’s motion to suppress
because the totality of the circumstances made it reasonable for Agent Massie to
suspect that the vehicle occupants were engaged in criminal activity. See United
States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an
officer on a roving border patrol may conduct a brief investigatory stop if she has
“a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (explaining that a reviewing court looks
to the “totality of the circumstances” to see whether the officer had a
“particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
First, the vehicle appeared in the late hours of the evening at an intersection
which was experiencing a high level of alien smuggling traffic. Second, the
intersection was located in a rural and sparsely populated area two and a half miles
from the United States-Mexico border (which was only partially fenced in this
area), and close to a known alien pick-up point. Third, Agent Massie was
intimately familiar with the area’s residents, vehicles, and traffic patterns, and did
not recognize the vehicle as a local vehicle, and noticed it was atypical for the area

-- 2 of 3 --

3 17-50404
because it was brand new. Fourth, the vehicle was a rental, and Agent Massie knew
that rental vehicles were often used by alien and drug smugglers. Fifth, the vehicle
passed through the intersection and headed toward the border (and the pick-up
point), and then returned in an amount of time sufficient in Agent Massie’s
estimation to pick up aliens and turn around. Finally, when Agent Massie
attempted to catch up to the vehicle on Interstate 8, the vehicle increased its speed,
as if trying to evade capture.
Consistent with the totality of the circumstances test, the district court
viewed Agent Massie’s observations in the aggregate, and gave due weight to the
inferences that Agent Massie drew from those observations prior to ruling that the
stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Reviewing de novo the district court’s
determination that reasonable suspicion existed, and the findings of fact for clear
error, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion to
suppress. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --