United States v. 2019-03-19 | 17-55802 | LUZ GARCIA V. NANCY BERRYHILL | nonprecedential | memorandum…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUZ ALAICIA GARCIA, ) No. 17-55802
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) D.C. No. 8:16-cv-00381-SJO-JEM
)
v. ) MEMORANDUM*
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 6, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: FERNANDEZ and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,***
Chief District Judge.
Luz Garcia appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
FILED
MAR 19 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
*This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

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Commissioner of Social Security’s (Commissioner) denial of her applications for
benefits under Social Security Act Titles II1 and XVI.2 We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
(1) The administrative law judge (ALJ) provided an adequate rationale for
his residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment, which was supported by
substantial evidence. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219,
1222–23, 1126 (9th Cir. 2009).
(a) He reviewed the objective medical evidence and concluded that it
generally showed mild to moderate diagnostic findings, many normal exam
findings, and improvement in Garcia’s condition as a result of conservative
treatments. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). He
reasonably determined that the opinions of the examining and non-examining
physicians regarding Garcia’s capacity were consistent with the medical record as a
whole and were entitled to significant weight. See id. at 956–57; Tonapetyan v.
Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Magallanes v. Bowen, 881
F.2d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ provided “‘specific and legitimate
reasons’ for discounting” the opinions of Garcia’s treating physicians. See Bray,
142 U.S.C. §§ 401–34.
242 U.S.C. §§ 1381–83f.
2

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554 F.3d at 1228; Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957.
(b) The ALJ also gave “‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’”3 supported
by substantial evidence4 for not entirely crediting Garcia’s own account of the
severity of her symptoms.5 To the extent that other reasons relied upon by the ALJ
were not supported by substantial evidence, that reliance was harmless in these
circumstances. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162
(9th Cir. 2008).
(c) The RFC incorporated limitations for Garcia’s impairments of obesity
and carpal tunnel syndrome. See SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281, at *6 (Sept. 12,
2002); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 684. In light of the medical record, the ALJ
reasonably did not include limitations arising from depression, anxiety, and
drowsiness. That record was adequate and not ambiguous with regard to those
supposed impairments6 and did not support a determination that they would affect
3Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014).
4Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959; see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th
Cir. 1989).
5See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir.
2014); see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2012); Burch
v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005); Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d
824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001).
6See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001).
3

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her RFC.7
(2) The Commissioner reasonably concluded that Garcia was able to perform
her past relevant work as an electronics assembler, in light of Garcia’s own
testimony and that of the vocational expert, which was consistent8 with the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. See Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844–45
(9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2) (2012).
AFFIRMED.
7See Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 2011);
Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1528(a)–(b) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508 (1991); see also Osenbrock v.
Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001).
8See Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
id. at 1154 n.19. Here, when asked, the vocational expert said that her testimony
was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
4

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