United States of America v. CARLOS SANCHEZ, AKA Carlos Miguel Sanchez

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CARLOS SANCHEZ, AKA Carlos Miguel
Sanchez,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18-10033
D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00049-WBS-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2019**
Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Carlos Sanchez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the
121-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for distribution
of heroin and methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 22 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 18-10033
Sanchez contends that the district court procedurally erred by imposing the
sentence recommended by the government without analyzing the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. Sanchez also contends that the district court erred by
failing to explain why it rejected his request for a 60-month sentence and why it
believed a sentence less than 121 months was insufficient. Contrary to Sanchez’s
contention, we review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608
F.3d 1103, 1108 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. After
acknowledging Sanchez’s mitigating arguments, the district court stated that it had
considered all of the relevant section 3553(a) sentencing factors, noted its concern
about Sanchez’s criminal history and the nature of the offense, and explained that a
60-month sentence would not be sufficient in light of the severity of the offense
and the other sentencing factors. The court was not required to “tick off” each of
the section 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc), and its explanation of the within-Guidelines sentence was
sufficient, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358-59 (2007).
Sanchez next contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in
light of his acceptance of responsibility and family history, which he argues
decrease his likelihood of recidivism. The district court did not abuse its
discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Sanchez’s sentence
is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors and

-- 2 of 3 --

3 18-10033
the totality of the circumstances, including the amount of drugs involved in the
offense and Sanchez’s criminal history.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --