John C. Manos v. THE WOLF FIRM, A Law Corporation;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN C. MANOS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE WOLF FIRM, A Law Corporation; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-55729
D.C. No. 8:18-cv-00138-JLS-JDE
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2019**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, LEAVY and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
John C. Manos appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
action alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices (“FDCPA”). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and we may affirm on any
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAY 29 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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ground supported by the record. Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093
(9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
Dismissal of Manos’s FDCPA claims against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
was proper because Manos failed to allege facts sufficient to show that JPMorgan
Chase was a debt collector rather than a creditor seeking to collect a debt on its
own account. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (excluding from the definition of
debt collector a creditor collecting debts on its own behalf); Afewerki v. Anaya Law
Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 779, n.1 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Under the FDCPA, a creditor
collecting debts on its own behalf is not a ‘debt collector.’”); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Dismissal of the FDCPA claims against Northwest Trustee Services, Inc.
and RCO Legal, P.S. was proper because Manos failed to allege facts sufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (prohibiting the taking
of any nonjudicial foreclosure action without a present right to possession of the
property claimed as collateral); Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holtus, LLP, 139 S. Ct.
1029, 1038 (2019) (“[B]ut for § 1692f(6), those who engage in only nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings are not debt collectors within the meaning of the
[FDCPA].”); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 970-971 (9th Cir.

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2017) (explaining that “while the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement
activity, it does so only through Section 1692f(6)” and discussing protections for
borrowers set forth in § 1692f(6) (emphasis omitted)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to enter a default
judgment against Northwest and RCO. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-
72 (9th Cir. 1986) (listing factors that the district court may consider in exercising
discretion as to the entry of a default judgment); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089,
1092-93 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that the district court does not abuse its
discretion in declining to enter a default judgment where substantive claims lack
merit).
AFFIRMED.

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