Johnny R. Andoe v. Joe Biden;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHNNY R. ANDOE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOE BIDEN; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 19-35082
D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00395-BLW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 11, 2019**
Before: WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Johnny R. Andoe, an Idaho state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), challenging
the constitutionality of various federal and state laws. We have jurisdiction under
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 16 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892
(9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152
F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Andoe’s action because Andoe failed
to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed
liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief); Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2003) (to
state a Bivens claim for relief, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendants,
while acting under color of federal law, deprived the plaintiff of a federal
constitutional right); see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626
(2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . .”); United States v.
Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[F]elons are categorically
different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms [under
the Second Amendment]”.).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

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All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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