United States v. 2020-11-16 | 19-10424 | USA V. GUADALUPE CAMPOY-RUBALCABA | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GUADALUPE CAMPOY-RUBALCABA,
AKA Guadalupe Campoy, AKA Guadalupe
Lopez-Perez,

Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 19-10424
19-10425

D.C. Nos. 2:18-cr-01122-GMS-1
2:19-cr-00449-GMS-1

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 9, 2020
**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

In these consolidated appeals, Guadalupe Campoy-Rubalcaba appeals from
the district court’s judgment imposing a 24-month sentence following his guilty-
plea conviction for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

NOV 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

2 19-10424 & 19-10425
its order revoking supervised release and imposing a 4-month consecutive
sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Campoy-Rubalcaba does not challenge the 4-month sentence imposed upon
revocation. Accordingly, we affirm in Appeal No. 19-10424. See United States v.
Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) (issue is waived if it is not argued in
the opening brief).
In Appeal No. 19-10425, Campoy-Rubalcaba first contends that the district
court procedurally erred by failing to consider all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors, instead focusing only on his criminal history, and by
inadequately explaining the sentence. We review for plain error, see United States
v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that
there is none. The record reflects that the district court considered the § 3553(a)
factors and adequately explained its reasons for imposing the within-Guidelines
sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Contrary to Campoy-Rubalcaba’s argument, the court was not required to “tick
off” all of the § 3553(a) factors, or address specifically each of his mitigating
arguments. See id.
Campoy-Rubalcaba next contends that the sentence is substantively
unreasonable given his mitigating circumstances. The district court did not abuse
its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The sentence is

3 19-10424 & 19-10425
substantively reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the
circumstances, including Campoy-Rubalcaba’s criminal and immigration history.
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez, 587 F.3d
904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various factors in a particular
case is for the discretion of the district court.”). The record does not support
Campoy-Rubalcaba’s claim that the district court placed undue weight on the
dismissed charges that led to his discovery by immigration authorities, or relied on
any erroneous facts concerning those charges.
AFFIRMED.