Patrick Dingman v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PATRICK DINGMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-17284

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02167-JZB

MEMORANDUM
*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Zachary Boyle, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 23, 2020
**

Before: GOODWIN, SCHROEDER, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Patrick Dingman appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Dingman’s application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Molina v.

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED

NOV 30 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.
The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) provided specific, clear, and
convincing reasons to discount Dingman’s symptom testimony. See Orn v. Astrue,
495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007) (standard for rejecting claimant’s testimony
about the severity of symptoms). The ALJ properly discounted Dingman’s
testimony as inconsistent with his daily activities and because the evidence showed
his symptoms improved with treatment. See id. at 639 (ALJ may discount
claimant’s testimony if the claimant’s daily activities contradict the testimony);
Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling
for the purpose of determining eligibility for [disability insurance] benefits”). Any
error in the ALJ’s additional reasons for discounting Dingman’s symptom
testimony was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (error is harmless where it
is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for assigning little weight
to the controverted opinion of treating physician Dr. Anderson. See Batson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard for
rejecting the controverted opinion of a treating physician). The ALJ properly
found Dr. Anderson’s opinion inconsistent with the medical evidence of record,

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including records indicating that Dingman was cleared to return to work, and
Dingman’s significant activities of daily living, including evidence that he was the
primary care provider for his young son. See id. (“an ALJ may discredit treating
physicians’ opinions that are . . . unsupported by the record as a whole, or by
objective medical findings” (citation omitted)); Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1999) (inconsistency between medical
opinion and reported daily activities was a specific and legitimate reason to reject
opinion). While the ALJ may have erred in failing to expressly address Dr.
Anderson’s August 2014 and October 2016 opinions, see Tommasetti v. Astrue,
533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The ALJ must consider all medical opinion
evidence.”), any error was harmless in light of the ALJ’s other specific and
legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Anderson’s similar assessments. See
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to credit the opinions of
the state agency medical consultants. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144,
1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (contrary opinion of a non-examining medical expert may
constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other independent
evidence in the record).
AFFIRMED.