Cha Thao Moua v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHA THAO MOUA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 19-15047
D.C. No. 1:17-cv-01223-EPG
MEMORANDUM*
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Erica Grosjean, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 2, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and IKUTA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Dissent by Chief Judge THOMAS
Cha Thao Moua appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability benefits. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 5 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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“We review the district court’s decision de novo and therefore must
independently determine whether the Commissioner’s decision (1) is free of legal
error and (2) is supported by substantial evidence.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d
1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
1. Substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) determination of Moua’s physical residual functional capacity. Contrary
to Moua’s argument, the ALJ considered all the medical evidence as to Moua’s
physical limitations and provided specific and legitimate reasons to support his
analysis. As the ALJ explained, while there was evidence that Moua had back,
hip, and shoulder sprains or strains, little evidence supported the significant
limitations treating physician Dr. Yang imposed. And because examining
physician Dr. Rios’s opinion was undermined by Moua’s suboptimal effort during
two key aspects of the exam, the ALJ gave his report little weight. See Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e must uphold the ALJ’s
findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”).
The ALJ “set[] out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting
clinical evidence, stat[ed] [his] interpretation thereof, and ma[de] findings” as

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required. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reddick
v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)).
The ALJ did not impose his own lay medical opinion. He was not required
to reiterate the conclusions of any single medical opinion or adopt any opinion in
full. Rather, the residual functional capacity determination is an administrative,
not a medical, finding. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545; Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d
1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s determination that Moua could perform
medium work is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination of Moua’s
mental residual functional capacity. Even assuming the ALJ erred by failing to
specifically analyze the treating psychiatrist’s notes and giving more weight to the
opinion of non-examining state agency doctors without adequate explanation, see
Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012, the error was inconsequential because the ALJ found
that Moua’s “affective disorder” was a severe impairment, in keeping with the
treating psychiatrist’s major depression diagnosis. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141,
1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (“We may affirm the ALJ’s decision even if the ALJ made an
error, so long as the error was harmless, meaning it was inconsequential to the
ultimate nondisability determination.” (quotation omitted)). The same is true of
any error the ALJ may have made in purportedly giving the opinion of one

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examining psychiatrist, Dr. Zhang, little weight, because the ALJ ultimately
accepted Dr. Zhang’s diagnoses.
AFFIRMED.

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Moua v. Saul; No. 19-15047
THOMAS, Chief Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Substantial evidence does not support the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)
determination that Moua could perform medium work, including occasionally
lifting up to 50 pounds. The state physicians provided the only medical opinions
that supported this medium-work finding, as the treating and examining physicians
found that Moua could lift no more than 10 or 20 pounds. But the ALJ did not
provide specific and legitimate reasons for preferring the state physicians’ opinions
to the treating and examining physicians’ opinions. Indeed, the ALJ expressly
gave “[l]ittle weight” to the state physicians’ opinions because later evidence
showed impairments that the state physicians had not identified. After the ALJ’s
discounting of the state physicians’ opinions, there is insufficient remaining
evidence to support a medium-work RFC finding, and no legitimate and specific
reasons for rejecting the opinions of the treating and examining physicians.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand.
FILED
FEB 5 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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