David C. Geroux v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID C. GEROUX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-35558
D.C. No. 3:19-cv-05811-BAT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 15, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
David Geroux appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income due to a combination of mental impairments. We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 20 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing the district court’s decision de
novo and the determination of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) for substantial
evidence, Dale v. Colvin, 823 F.3d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 2016), we affirm.
Substantial evidence supports the specific and legitimate reasons for the
ALJ’s decision to give less weight to certain portions of Dr. Powell and Dr.
Coleman’s opinions. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). Among
other things, Dr. Powell’s opinion that Geroux was markedly limited in his ability
to accept instruction from and respond appropriately to criticism from a supervisor
was inconsistent with other medical evidence, treatment notes, Geroux’s
improvement with conservative treatment, and his daily activities. See id. at 1154–
55 (inconsistencies with other medical evidence and daily activities); Wellington v.
Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (evidence indicating improvement with
treatment). The ALJ similarly explained that Dr. Coleman’s assessment of marked
limitations conflicted with evidence of Geroux’s daily activities and improvement
with treatment, Dr. Coleman served as Geroux’s marriage counselor, and her
treatment notes were not in the record. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1155 (“[T]he ALJ may
permissibly reject check-off reports that do not contain any explanation of the bases
of their conclusions.” (quoting Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.
2012))).

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The ALJ did not err by finding Geroux’s subjective symptom testimony was
not fully credible. Sufficient evidence supports the ALJ’s specific, clear, and
convincing reasons, including that Geroux’s testimony regarding the severity of his
symptoms was inconsistent with his daily activities, former reports to medical
professionals of improvement with conservative treatment and abstinence from
alcohol, and with other observations in his treatment records. See, e.g., Parra v.
Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying on evidence of “conservative
treatment” to discount testimony regarding severity of impairment); Morgan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
inconsistencies between symptom testimony and daily activities were sufficient to
discount claimant’s testimony).
Substantial evidence similarly supports the ALJ’s specific and germane
reasons for giving less weight to a statement from Geroux’s former supervisor and
little weight to the statement and testimony of Geroux’s wife. See Carmickle v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008).
Finally, because the ALJ did not err in assessing the medical evidence,
Geroux’s testimony, or lay witness statements, the ALJ likewise did not err in the
assessment of Geroux’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). The ALJ included in
the RFC non-exertional limitations that were consistent with the record as a whole,

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and the ALJ’s RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence. See
Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.

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