Patrick Hickman v. Kenneth Mead, in his individual and official capacities; JESSICA WALSH

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK HICKMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KENNETH MEAD, in his individual and
official capacities; JESSICA WALSH,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Custodian;
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Real-parties-in-interest.
No. 20-15354
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00404-GMN-
NJK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 20, 2021**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Hickman’s request for oral
argument, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.
FILED
APR 27 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Patrick Hickman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims related to his criminal
prosecution for theft. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a district court’s judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Lyon
v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hickman’s malicious prosecution
claims because Hickman failed to allege facts sufficient to show lack of probable
cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. See Awabdy v.
City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (elements of a § 1983
malicious prosecution claim); LaMantia v. Redisi, 38 P.3d 877, 879 (Nev. 2002)
(elements of malicious prosecution under Nevada state law). Hickman contends
that his actions did not constitute a crime under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.130 but
Hickman was not charged or prosecuted under that statute.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hickman leave to
amend because granting leave would have prejudiced defendants and because the
new claims Hickman alleged in his second amended complaint could have been
brought in his earlier complaints. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385,
1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard of review, listing the factors for which
leave to amend may be denied, and noting that “[p]rejudice to the opposing party is
the most important factor”). Contrary to Hickman’s contention that information he

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received after the close of discovery would support new claims under the Right to
Financial Privacy Act, only agencies or departments of the United States and
financial institutions are liable under this statute and there is no remedy of
suppression. See 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (providing for civil penalties against an
“agency or department of the United States or financial institution”); United States
v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986) (no remedy of suppression).
We reject as without merit Hickman’s contentions that the district court and
Magistrate Judge Koppe worked in concert to ensure that Hickman’s case would
be dismissed and that he was entitled to damages discovery on his dismissed
claims.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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