Dongfang Huo v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DONGFANG HUO,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-70966
Agency No. A201-208-495
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 10, 2021**
Pasadena, California
Before: R. NELSON and BADE, Circuit Judges, and HELLERSTEIN,*** District
Judge.
Dongfang Huo, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”)
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAY 12 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2
order denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Petitioner challenges the BIA and IJ’s
(collectively, “Agency”) adverse credibility determination based on her demeanor
and inconsistencies in her testimony. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
We deny the petition for review.
We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for
substantial evidence. See Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.
2020); Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). “Considering
the totality of the circumstances,” the Agency “may base a credibility
determination on the [applicant’s] demeanor, candor, or responsiveness . . . , the
inherent plausibility of the . . . account, the consistency of [the applicant’s]
statements . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in [the applicant’s] statements,
without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the
heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “Where, as here, the
BIA agrees with and incorporates specific findings of the IJ while adding its own
reasoning, we review both decisions.” Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042
(9th Cir. 2016).
To begin with, the Agency found that Petitioner’s demeanor undermined her
credibility. She was flippant in explaining she had previously memorized the
information in her visa application but now did not remember any of the

-- 2 of 4 --

3
information because none of it was true. Moreover, she laughed in amusement at
her own testimony while responding to questions about her former boyfriend, the
supposed father of her aborted child. After repeated admonishment by the IJ, she
unpersuasively explained she laughed because she had a current boyfriend with the
same name as her former boyfriend.
The Agency additionally identified several inconsistencies in Petitioner’s
testimony. Particularly, Petitioner never testified that her abortion was coerced and
omitted significant details about the supposed coercion until she was questioned on
cross-examination. The Agency found unconvincing Petitioner’s explanation that
she was simply answering what was asked, noting she had been asked open-ended
questions.
Further, Petitioner initially testified she suffered facial cuts from a beating
during her detention and interrogation. But later she retracted this claim, stating
she suffered only bruises. The Agency found unconvincing her explanation that
she misunderstood the meaning of “cut,” as she was unable to explain what she had
understood it to mean.
Finally, Petitioner testified that she decided to study abroad in 2010 after her
alleged arrest for attending a church. But Petitioner had applied for a passport in
2009, prior to her alleged arrest. Petitioner then admitted she had planned to study
abroad in 2009, which prompted her passport application. Her explanation that

-- 3 of 4 --

4
studying abroad was a “possibility” in 2009 was found unpersuasive.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supports
the Agency’s adverse credibility determination. The Agency provided numerous
“specific and cogent reasons” supporting its adverse credibility determination and
why it found Petitioner’s explanations unconvincing. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at
1042. And Petitioner did not provide objective documentary evidence that
rehabilitated her credibility. See Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.
2017). She provided evidence only of abortion, but not of any coercion, and no
evidence as to the circumstances regarding her treatment for swelling, bruising,
headache, and dizziness.
The Agency’s adverse credibility finding renders Petitioner ineligible for
asylum or withholding of removal. See id. Likewise, because the central evidence
supporting her CAT claim––Petitioner’s testimony––is discredited, her CAT claim
also fails. See Singh v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2015). The remainder
of the evidence does not “compel the conclusion that [Petitioner] is more likely
than not to be tortured.” See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1049.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

-- 4 of 4 --