Samantha Mariel Amparo- Gomez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAMANTHA MARIEL AMPARO-
GOMEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-72839
Agency No. A201-683-138
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 19, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: LINN,*** RAWLINSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JUN 3 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Richard Linn, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

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Petitioner Samantha Amparo-Gomez (Amparo-Gomez), a citizen of Mexico,
petitions for review of the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) affirming an
asylum officer’s negative reasonable fear determination in reinstatement of
removal proceedings.1
Congress has authorized the expedited removal of undocumented
immigrants who have “reentered the United States illegally after having been
removed under an order of removal.” Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 808
(9th Cir. 2018) (citation and alteration omitted). Nevertheless, one subject to
expedited removal may request withholding of removal. See id.; see also Gomez-
Velazco v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018). An applicant for
withholding of removal must establish that government forces either directly
persecuted Petitioner or were unable or unwilling to control private persecutors.
See J.R. v. Barr, 975 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2020).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that the Mexican
government is willing to protect victims of domestic violence. See Bartolome, 904
F.3d at 811 (applying the substantial evidence standard). The IJ noted that the
2018 Country Report for Mexico reflected that the Special Prosecutor’s Office for
1Petitioner waived review of her Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim
by failing to assert it in her Opening Brief. See Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083,
1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011).
2

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Violence against Women and Trafficking in Persons leads government programs to
combat domestic violence. The office had thirty prosecutors, nine of whom were
exclusively dedicated to federal cases involving violence against women.
Accordingly, resolution of this case turns on the Mexican government’s ability to
control domestic violence. See J.R., 975 F.3d at 782 (“In other words, the question
on this step is whether the government both ‘could and would provide
protection.’”) (citation and emphasis omitted).
Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s conclusion that the Mexican
government possesses the ability to combat domestic violence. This case,
therefore, can be distinguished from J.R.. Unlike in J.R., the Mexican government
never offered and subsequently withdrew protection. Indeed, Amparo-Gomez did
not seek protection. Cf. id. at 783 (concluding that “[h]ad the government been
willing to continue to provide effective protection, [Petitioner] would have lacked
a viable claim, for the government would have been both willing and able to
protect him.”).
Petitioner’s assertion that reporting her harm would have been futile is
unavailing given the resources devoted by the Mexican government to combatting
domestic violence. See Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.
2005) (rejecting a similar argument).
3

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In sum, the evidence does not compel us to reach a conclusion contrary to
the IJ’s finding that the Mexican government is willing and able to control
domestic violence. See Bartolome, 904 F.3d at 811 (holding that “we must uphold
the IJ’s conclusion . . . unless, based on the evidence, any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).2
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate. The motion for a stay of removal, filed on November 8, 2019, is
otherwise denied.
PETITION DENIED.
2Having determined that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision that
Petitioner failed to establish that the Mexican government is unable or unwilling to
protect her, we need not address any remaining issues. See INS v. Bagamasbad,
429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to
make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they
reach. . . .”) (citations omitted).
4

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