16-70360•Dongmei Liang v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General
16-70360Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit4 de jun. de 2021
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DONGMEI LIANG,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 16-70360
Agency No. A206-042-045
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 14, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: NGUYEN and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and BURGESS,*** Chief
District Judge.
Dongmei Liang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Timothy M. Burgess, Chief United States District
Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
FILED
JUN 4 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
“In reviewing an adverse credibility determination, we consider ‘the reasons
explicitly identified by the BIA, and the reasoning articulated in the IJ’s decision in
support of those reasons.’” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir.
2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2014)).
“We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for
substantial evidence.” Id.
In upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, the BIA relied on
relevant factors, including Liang’s demeanor and inconsistent statements. See 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Liang provided inconsistent statements about the
persons who forcibly took her from her home to have an abortion and the date that
this occurred, the date that she secretly had her IUD removed, and the type of tests
to which she was subjected in 2012. These inconsistencies were not “mere trivial
error[s],” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010), but rather were
important details about the events giving rise to her claim for relief. Although
Liang argues that there are plausible reasons for the discrepancies that do not
undermine her credibility, the IJ considered those explanations and was not
required to accept them. See Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 739 (9th Cir. 2014)
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(“[T]o overturn an IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we must find that ‘the
evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.’” (cleaned up)
(quoting Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011))). Moreover, Liang
does not address the IJ’s finding that her facial expression and hesitation answering
questions about the inconsistencies was a “significant” factor in the credibility
ruling.
PETITION DENIED.
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