United States of America v. Sean Scates

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SEAN SCATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20-10427
D.C. No.
1:18-cr-00133-LEK-WRP-16
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 15, 2021**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, MILLER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Sean Scates challenges the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more
of methamphetamine. As the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only
as necessary to explain our decision.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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I
Scates argues that the district court erred when it did not sua sponte grant
him a downward adjustment for his role in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
But Scates did not timely argue for a downward adjustment. Instead, he used the
language of section 3B1.2 to argue that his role in the offense was a mitigating
circumstance. Because Scates was aware of his right to request an adjustment for
his role in the offense and relinquished it “for some tactical or other reason,” he
waived such right, and “there is no error, plain or otherwise.” United States v.
Depue, 912 F.3d 1227, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
II
Scates next argues that the district court applied the wrong legal standard or
clearly erred by considering as relevant conduct his actions tracking a parcel with
4,888 grams of methamphetamine. The district court correctly applied U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3, which defines relevant conduct to include “all acts and omissions
committed, aided, [or] abetted” by the defendant. Scates tracked the parcel for his
co-conspirators, thereby aiding its distribution, and the district court was correct to
consider such conduct relevant to his sentence. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
III
Scates then argues that the district court plainly erred when it imposed the
first and third special conditions of supervised release by delegating to the

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probation officer the discretion to force Scates indefinitely to participate in
inpatient substance abuse treatment or mental health treatment. The district court
delegated to the probation officer the discretion to decide the “location, modality,
duration, and intensity” of treatment and did not cabin that discretion to exclude
inpatient treatment. On the face of the sentence, such treatment could not be
indefinite: it was limited to “FIVE (5) YEARS” of supervised release.
Nevertheless, because inpatient confinement implicates a significant liberty
interest, conditions 1 and 3 were without appropriate limitation. Absent explicit
limitations on the scope of treatment, it is reasonable to construe “location,
modality, duration, and intensity” to encompass inpatient confinement. By
including such language, the first and third conditions impermissibly delegated to
the probation officer the power to decide “the nature [and] extent of the
punishment to be imposed.” United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 881 (9th
Cir. 2005)). The district court thus purported to delegate the judicial power which
Article III vests in the federal courts. See Stephens, 424 F.3d at 881. We therefore
vacate these conditions and remand for the district court to limit the scope of the
delegation as appropriate.
IV

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Finally, Scates argues that the district court plainly erred by imposing
financial disclosure requirements as a condition of supervised release. Because
Scates was “involved in a large scale drug conspiracy” and has “a history of drug
abuse,” financial disclosure requirements reflect “‘the nature and circumstances of
the offense and [Scates’s] history and characteristics’” and serve “‘to protect the
public from future crimes.’” United States v. Garcia, 522 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir.
2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). The imposition of such requirements was
thus appropriate.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

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