Lecia L. Shorter v. Leroy D. Baca;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LECIA L. SHORTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LEROY D. BACA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 19-56182
20-55126
D.C. No.
2:12-cv-07337-DOC-GJS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 20, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and Y. ROGERS,** District
Judge.
Following her pre-trial incarceration at the Century Regional Detention
Facility (“CRDF”), an all-women’s jail, Lecia Shorter sued CRDF under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged violations of her constitutional rights. Shorter lost her first trial.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, United States District Judge
for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
OCT 26 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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On appeal, we reversed the denial of Shorter’s motion for a new trial and vacated
the partial grant of summary judgment against Shorter. See Shorter v. Baca, 895
F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2018).
Upon remand, a jury again found against Shorter. Shorter filed a Renewed
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative, for a New Trial
(“JMOL Motion”). The district court granted the JMOL Motion as to the lack of
recreation claim, but denied it as to all other claims. Shorter timely appealed the
partial denial of this motion. Also, Shorter separately appealed the denial of her
Rule 60(b) motion, which she filed after filing her appeal of the JMOL Motion
ruling, and she requested Rule 11 sanctions against CRDF’s counsel. Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and reverse in part the ruling
on Shorter’s JMOL Motion, affirm the denial of Shorter’s Rule 60(b) motion, and
deny Shorter’s request for Rule 11 sanctions.
1. We reverse under de novo review the denial of Shorter’s JMOL
Motion on her excessive search claim, see Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d
1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), and hold that she is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on this claim. Construing the evidence “in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party,” id., we conclude that CRDF failed to provide any
penological justification for leaving inmates unclothed and chained for any period
of time after their clothes had already been searched, thus violating the Fourth and

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Fourteenth Amendments. See Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir.
1988) (explaining jail’s search procedure violates Fourth Amendment if it is
“unrelated to any legitimate penological interest”); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (explaining jail’s
search procedure violates Fourteenth Amendment if it is “unrelated to a legitimate
governmental objective”) (cleaned up). In addition, “the jail had an alternative,
less abusive means of obtaining contraband from inmates,” further undermining
CRDF’s decision to leave inmates chained to the door without their clothing after
their clothes had been searched during an interrupted body cavity search. See
Shorter, 895 F.3d at 1188–89. Thus, there was not “sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s conclusion” that the procedure was justified. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1066.
2. The district court also erred in denying Shorter’s JMOL Motion as to
her inadequate sanitation claim. See id. She is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on this claim. Because jail officials under the Fourteenth Amendment “have a
duty to ensure that detainees are provided adequate . . . sanitation,” Shorter, 895
F.3d at 1185, we have “never condoned the wholesale, routine deprivation of . . .
showers,” id. at 1186. Yet there is no evidence in this case from which the jury
could conclude that Shorter received more than three showers during her 32-day
confinement. The CRDF’s prison logs documented that she received only three
showers, and the jury heard evidence of multiple complaints about inmates not

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receiving showers. Although CRDF introduced evidence of a policy to offer
showers every other day, there is no evidence that CRDF followed the policy.
“JMOL [was] appropriate,” then, on the inadequate sanitation claim because “the
jury could have relied only on speculation to reach its verdict.” Lakeside-Scott v.
Multnomah Cnty., 556 F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 2009).
3. We affirm the denial of Shorter’s JMOL Motion as to her deprivation
of meals claim. Although the Fourteenth Amendment protects a pretrial detainee’s
“right against jail conditions or restrictions that amount to punishment,” Pierce v.
Cnty. Of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up), sufficient
evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Shorter was not denied meals, see
Castro, 833 F.3d at 1066. CRDF officers testified that they did not deny Shorter
meals, and that, as a policy, meals were denied only temporarily due to court
appearances or legitimate safety concerns. And even when Shorter was attending
court, she was provided a burrito for a meal.
4. We also affirm the denial of Shorter’s JMOL Motion on her
inadequate medical care claim. Inadequate medical care claims brought by pretrial
detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment are subject to an objective deliberate
indifference standard. Gordon v. Cnty of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th
Cir. 2018) (elements of deliberate indifference). At trial, the jury heard evidence
that it was reasonable to suspend Shorter’s blood thinners due to her high INR

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levels, and that Shorter was taken to a lab for follow-up blood tests after her blood
thinners were discontinued, but the jury heard no evidence that suspending
Shorter’s medication caused her injury or put her at substantial risk of serious
harm, see id. (requiring demonstration of injury and substantial risk of serious
harm for inadequate medical care claims).
5. The district court correctly denied Shorter’s JMOL Motion as to her
improper classification claim. Because Shorter was placed in the High
Observation Housing Unit (“HOH”), she possessed a right as a pretrial detainee “to
procedural due process before [being] subjected to more severe conditions of
confinement than other detainees.” See Shorter, 895 F.3d at 1190. However,
CRDF presented “sufficient evidence” that Shorter was properly classified,
grievance procedures were in place, and Shorter was given the opportunity to
dispute her placement in HOH. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1066.
6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shorter’s
motion for a new trial. See Kode v. Carlson, 596 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam). Shorter’s claims of misconduct by counsel and erroneous evidentiary
rulings were “made in passing and not supported by citations to the record or to
case authority,” so they have been waived. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d
1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010). On the claims in which we reverse the denial of the
JMOL Motion, Shorter is entitled to judgment. On those we affirm, she has not

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demonstrated she is entitled to a new trial. See Kode, 596 F.3d at 612.
7. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Shorter’s
Rule 60(b) motion due to lack of jurisdiction. See NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC,
840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016). Shorter filed the Rule 60(b) motion almost two
months after filing this appeal and sought to void the very orders over which we
have jurisdiction. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58
(1982) (“The filing of a notice of appeal . . . divests the district court of its control
over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”).
8. Finally, we deny Shorter’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions. We disagree
with Shorter’s contentions both that CRDF’s briefing was “presented for any
improper purpose,” and that the briefing contained arguments not “warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)–(2); see also
United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001).
As such, Shorter’s motion for sanctions is denied.
In conclusion, the district court’s denial of Shorter’s JMOL Motion is
REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part, the denial of Shorter’s Rule 60(b)
motion is AFFIRMED, and Shorter’s request for Rule 11 sanctions is DENIED.
This case is REMANDED to the district court for adjudication of the amount of
damages to which Shorter is entitled on her lack of recreation, excessive search,

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and inadequate sanitation claims. Each side shall bear its own costs of appeal.

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