Adam Paul Blomdahl v. JAFFE, Dr. (CHS) - County Health Services Doctor at Psychiatric Unit 3 (MCSO);

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADAM PAUL BLOMDAHL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAFFE, Dr. (CHS) - County Health Services
Doctor at Psychiatric Unit 3 (MCSO); et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-17321
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00227-MTL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 19, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Adam Paul Blomdahl appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
violations while he was a pretrial detainee. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 27 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Blomdahl’s
conditions-of-confinement claim because Blomdahl failed to bring this claim
within the applicable statute of limitations or establish a basis for equitable tolling.
See Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.
2008) (under federal law, which determines accrual, “a claim accrues when the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918,
927 (9th Cir. 2004) (§ 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s statute of
limitations for personal injury claims, including state law regarding tolling); see
also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-542(1) (two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury claim); Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 964 (Ariz. 1998) (unsound mind equitable
tolling may not be established by “conclusory averments” but rather requires the
plaintiff to set forth “hard evidence”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Blomdahl’s
excessive force claim because Blomdahl failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies and failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Ross v. Blake,
578 U.S. 632, 638, 641-44 (2016) (explaining that an inmate must exhaust such
administrative remedies as are available before bringing suit, and describing

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limited circumstances in which administrative remedies are unavailable);
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative
remedies . . . means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly
(so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation, internal quotation
marks, and emphasis omitted)); Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir.
2014) (en banc) (once the defendant has carried the burden to prove there was an
available administrative remedy, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce
evidence showing that administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to
him).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blomdahl’s motion
for appointment of counsel because Blomdahl failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for
appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blomdahl’s motion
to stay and motion relating to discovery. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706
(1997) (the district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to
its power to control its own docket”); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th
Cir. 2002) (the district court has broad discretion to permit or deny discovery, and
“its decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest

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showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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