Rigoberto Mejia-Chay v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RIGOBERTO MEJIA-CHAY,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-70390
Agency No. A208-573-243
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 15, 2022**
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Rigoberto Mejia-Chay, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his
appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 24 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse
credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d
1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination based on
inconsistencies as to whether Mejia-Chay spoke to his attackers when robbed, the
reason Mejia-Chay entered the United States and whether he fears future harm, and
the number of employees at his business, and based on a lack of corroborating
evidence. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d. at 1048 (adverse credibility determination
reasonable under “the totality of circumstances”). Mejia-Chay’s explanations do
not compel a contrary conclusion. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir.
2000). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Mejia-
Chay did not present corroborative evidence that would otherwise establish his
eligibility for relief. See Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014)
(applicant’s documentary evidence was insufficient to independently support
claim). Thus, in the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Mejia-Chay’s
asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d
1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence supports the denial of Mejia-Chay’s CAT claim
because it was based on the same evidence found not credible, and he does not

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point to any other record evidence that compels the conclusion that it is more likely
than not he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the
government if returned to Guatemala. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49.
Mejia-Chay does not raise, and therefore waives, any challenge to the BIA’s
determination that the record does not support his claim that the IJ showed a
pattern of prejudice. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th
Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party's opening brief are
waived).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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