Jing Sheng Chen v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JING SHENG CHEN,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-73267
Agency No. A047-860-759
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 7, 2022**
Portland, Oregon
Before: GRABER and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and REISS,*** District Judge.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of China who entered the United States as a
lawful permanent resident on April 23, 2001. In 2011, he was convicted of drug-
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Christina Reiss, United States District Judge for the
District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
related crimes in Oregon. An immigration judge (“IJ”) found that Petitioner was
removable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopted the IJ’s decision without opinion.
Petitioner seeks review of the BIA’s adoption of the IJ’s denial of his request for
deferral of removal under CAT. We deny the petition.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to
establish that it is “more likely than not” that he would be tortured if he returned to
China. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1303,
1305 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that we review for substantial evidence the denial of
CAT relief). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Petitioner’s
mistreatment did not rise to the level of past torture. Although government
officials detained Petitioner overnight in 2002 and beat him, Petitioner neither
provided specific testimony regarding his injuries nor claimed that his injuries
were severe or required medical treatment. A brief detention coupled with non-
specific, non-severe physical injuries does not rise to the level of past torture. See,
e.g., Kumar v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1043, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that
substantial evidence supported the IJ’s determination that a month-long detention
and multiple beatings by police did not rise to the level of torture). Nor does the
remaining evidence in the record, including evidence of country conditions,

-- 2 of 3 --

3
compel the conclusion that Petitioner would more likely than not be tortured.
We reject Petitioner’s argument that the BIA failed to consider all the
evidence in the record. Where, as here, the BIA adopts an IJ’s decision without
opinion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), we “review the IJ’s decision as if it
were the BIA’s decision.” Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted). The IJ expressly considered the evidence of country conditions
and reasonably concluded that it failed to meet Petitioner’s burden.
PETITION DENIED.

-- 3 of 3 --