ZHONGWEN TANG, AKA Ken Chan, AKA Andrew Tang, AKA Zhong Tang v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ZHONGWEN TANG, AKA Ken Chan,
AKA Andrew Tang, AKA Zhong Tang,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-71471
Agency No. A070-041-799
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 15, 2022**
Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: RAWLINSON and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and COGAN,*** District
Judge.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the Immigration Judge’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Brian M. Cogan, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
MAR 18 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(“IJ”) denial of Petitioner Zhongwen Tang’s application for withholding of removal.
Tang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the denial of withholding of
removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition in part
and dismiss in part.1
We review questions of law de novo. Lopez v. I.N.S., 184 F.3d 1097, 1099
(9th Cir. 1999). “The court must uphold the BIA’s findings unless the evidence
presented would compel a reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result.”
Singh-Kaur v. I.N.S., 183 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 1999). “Where the BIA
issues its own decision but relies in part on the [IJ’s] reasoning, we review both
decisions.” Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
“A person seeking withholding of removal must prove not only that his life or
freedom will be threatened in his home country, but also that the threat is ‘because
of’ one of the five listed reasons.” Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357 (9th
Cir. 2017); see also id. at n.5 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)).
“To establish eligibility for withholding of removal in the absence of past
persecution, an applicant must demonstrate both that he has a subjective fear of
persecution in the future, and that this fear is objectively reasonable—which, in the
withholding context, means that the chance of future persecution is ‘more likely than
1 The IJ noted that “with respect to any application for post-conclusion voluntary
departure, the respondent is not eligible for this form of relief.” Tang did not
challenge this finding before the BIA or this Court.

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not.’” Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(b)(2)).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s finding that
Tang failed to establish past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution
in China. For example, Tang claims that “he was not permitted to attend college” in
China because he “attended a Baptist church, presumably one not aligned with or
otherwise sanctioned by the [Chinese] government.” But Tang provided no
evidence for this claim and described the church he allegedly attended once a week
in Shanghai only as “some kind of . . . Baptist Church or something.” Tang concedes
that “the Chinese government has allowed Christianity . . . to be practiced within its
borders,” and gives no evidence that the churches he attended or the Christian beliefs
he held and practiced were “presumably . . . not aligned with” the Chinese
government.
In fact, other than his unsubstantiated claim that he was barred from attending
university in China, Tang did not claim to have suffered any negative treatment from
the Chinese government because of his practice of Christianity. Tang conceded that
he was never “beaten or physically abused” by the Chinese government. Tang also
acknowledged that he did not fear going back to China when he first arrived in the
United States and claimed that he later developed a fear of returning to China
because his passport expired. There is no evidence that Tang’s failure to obtain a

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passport is due to his Christian beliefs; Tang merely speculates that “the possibility
also exists that . . . no passport has been or will be issued because he has been deemed
undesirable and unwelcome in his own country.”
Tang also claims that his grandparents “were detained for at least one year”
for “their practice of religions not sanctioned by the [Chinese] government.” But
Tang apparently conceded that he did not know why his grandparents were detained.
Tang also acknowledged that his grandparents continued to live in China after their
release, and Tang never argued that the Chinese government harmed them further.
See Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] petitioner’s fear of
future persecution ‘is weakened, even undercut, when similarly-situated family
members’ living in the petitioner’s home country are not harmed.”) (citation
omitted). Tang also claimed that his mother “had been denied retirement benefits,
presumably due to her or her parents’ exercise of religion.” But Tang provided no
evidence for this claim and failed to exhaust it before the BIA. See Zara v. Ashcroft,
383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have held that ‘[f]ailure to raise an issue in
an appeal to the BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust remedies with respect to that
question and deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.’”) (citations
omitted).
Finally, Tang claims that the Chinese authorities may “renew . . . [their]
interest . . . in [his] history of religious practice” or that he may be “already well

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known” to them. Tang testified before the IJ that he continues to attend a church in
Las Vegas “almost like once a week” and that he has friends there. But Tang stated
that he “forget[s] the name, the whole name” of the church and identified it only as
being “by the Chinatown” in Las Vegas. Tang also had no letters or testimony to
support his claim, from the church leadership or anyone with whom he attended
church. And Tang admitted that he has not suffered physical harm from the Chinese
government in the past. Thus, substantial evidence supported the IJ’s finding that
Tang failed to “establish a ‘clear probability’ of future persecution in China” due to
“any religious activities in which he has been participating in the United States,” and
that it was “unclear whether the respondent’s fear of return to China on account of
his religion is subjectively genuine.” See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1060 (“To establish
eligibility for withholding of removal in the absence of past persecution, an applicant
must demonstrate both that he has a subjective fear of persecution in the future, and
that this fear is objectively reasonable.”).
PETITION DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.

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