Peter Kleidman v. California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETER KLEIDMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL FOR
THE SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT;
TANI GORRE CANTIL-SAKAUYE; MING
W. CHIN; AUDREY B. COLLINS; CAROL
A. CORRIGAN; MARIANO-
FLORENTINO CUELLAR; DIVISION
FOUR OF THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF
APPEAL FOR THE SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT; DOES; NORMAL L. EPSTEIN;
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA;
LEONDRA R. KRUGER; GOODWIN H.
LIU; SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA; KATHRYN M.
WERDEGAR; THOMAS L. WILLHITE,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-56256
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-02365-PSG-JDE
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
APR 19 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2 20-56256
Submitted April 11, 2022**
Before: McKEOWN, CHRISTEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Peter Kleidman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging violations of federal and state law in connection with his state
court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir.
2002) (dismissal for lack of standing). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
Kleidman’s claims seeking to reopen or set aside rulings in the California state
courts because these claims constitute forbidden “de facto appeal[s]” of prior state
court judgments or are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. Noel v.
Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under
Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal
wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment
of that court.”); Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898 (holding that a claim was barred by
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

-- 2 of 4 --

3 20-56256
Rooker-Feldman because the court “cannot grant the relief [plaintiff] seeks without
‘undoing’ the decision of the state court”).
The district court properly dismissed for lack of standing Kleidman’s claims
concerning the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of California and rules
governing the citation of unpublished decisions in state and federal courts because
Kleidman failed to allege facts sufficient to establish an injury in fact as required
for Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992) (constitutional standing requires an “injury in fact,” causation, and
redressability; “injury in fact” refers to “an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“[T]hreatened injury
must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and . . . allegations of
possible future injury are not sufficient.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be without
prejudice to the claims being realleged in a competent court. See Kelly v.
Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Fleck &
Assocs., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal for
lack of standing is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Kougasian v.

-- 3 of 4 --

4 20-56256
TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal under Rooker-Feldman
is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). We instruct the district court
to amend the judgment to reflect that the dismissal of the federal claims is without
prejudice.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED with instructions.

-- 4 of 4 --