In re: JAMES LLOYD WALKER v. ROBERT S. WHITMORE, Chapter 7 Trustee

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: JAMES LLOYD WALKER,
Debtor,
------------------------------
JAMES LLOYD WALKER,
Appellant,
v.
ROBERT S. WHITMORE, Chapter 7
Trustee,
Appellee.
No. 22-60003
BAP No. 21-1162
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Faris, Lafferty III, and Spraker, Bankruptcy Judges
Submitted December 1, 2022**
Before: WALLACE, FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 2 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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James Lloyd Walker, a Chapter 7 debtor, appeals pro se from the decision of
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (BAP) that affirmed an Order
on Final Fee Applications granted by the bankruptcy court. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review BAP decisions de novo and independently
review the bankruptcy court’s decision. In re Candland, 90 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th
Cir. 1996), as amended (Oct. 2, 1996). We will not disturb a bankruptcy court’s
award of fees absent a finding that the court abused its discretion or erroneously
applied the law. In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 945 F.2d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1991).
A bankruptcy court “abuses its discretion if it applies the wrong legal standard or its
findings are illogical, implausible or without support in the record.” In re Gill, 574
B.R. 709, 714 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
In November 2015, Walker filed a chapter 7 petition, and Appellee Whitmore
was appointed chapter 7 trustee. After a years-long process, the bankruptcy court
awarded fees and costs to Whitmore, as well as the law firm and accounting firm he
had retained, in the total of $89,309.57. Walker appealed the award, claiming that
the expenses were excessive and some fees unnecessary. The BAP held that the
court did not err in its award of fees, and Walker appealed to our court.
While we construe a pro se debtor’s filings liberally, Walker’s pleadings must
still meet a minimum threshold in providing his opponents with notice of what they
allegedly did wrong. Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Walker’s arguments do not do so. Walker does not provide specific and distinct
allegations in his briefing as to how the fees are excessive and why the court’s
decision violates the bankruptcy code and other laws of the United States, as he
alleges. Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994).
Even if Walker’s briefing was sufficient, his argument fails on the merits. A
bankruptcy court may award reasonable compensation to professionals providing
actual and necessary services to a trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330. As the BAP
found, the bankruptcy court carefully reviewed the fee application and acted within
its discretion in determining that the services performed by Whitmore and his
professionals were actual and necessary and were at reasonable rates. The
bankruptcy court reduced some fees that it saw as excessive by $5,952, but it, as well
as the BAP, otherwise held that the rest were not excessive or unnecessary, largely
because they were a result of Walker’s uncooperative conduct during the process.
The bankruptcy court’s decision was not illogical, implausible, or without support
in the record, and thus it did not abuse its discretion.
To the contrary, there is support in the record that Walker’s own conduct
complicated, delayed, and obstructed the bankruptcy process. Over the course of
five years, Walker attempted to conceal ownership of his assets, refused to provide
the Trustee information about and access to his property, and strenuously opposed
the Trustee’s motions and court orders. Because of such conduct, Walker forced

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Whitmore and his hired professionals to provide more legal and accounting work
than they would have otherwise, and thus incurred higher costs as a result. The
bankruptcy court was within its discretion to hold the majority of these fees to be
reasonable according to the factors in 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a)(3) and (4). In re Jastrem,
253 F.3d 438, 443 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Peoro, 793 F.2d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that obstreperous, frivolous efforts to resist bankruptcy proceedings is an
abuse of the judicial system and paying costs resulting from such conduct is
reasonable).
AFFIRMED.

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