Candelaria Cruz-Martinez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CANDELARIA CRUZ-MARTINEZ; JOSE
ALBERTO BIRRUETA-CRUZ; ALMA
JHUSDIVIA PULIDO-CRUZ; MIGUEL
ANGEL PULIDO-CRUZ,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-70908
Agency Nos. A206-455-415
A206-455-416
A206-455-417
A206-455-418
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 7, 2022**
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, McKEOWN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Candelaria Cruz-Martinez and her three minor children petition for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) denial of reconsideration of its earlier
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 14 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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dismissal of her appeal. As the facts are known to the parties, we repeat them only
as necessary to explain our decision. We review denials of reconsideration for abuse
of discretion. Toor v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 1055, 1059 (2015). When, as here, a petition
for review is timely only with respect to the denial of motion to reconsider, our
jurisdiction is limited to that denial, and we do not review the initial BIA decision
directly. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405-06 (1995).
I
Cruz-Martinez argues that the BIA should have reconsidered her appeal
because its initial decision ignored her argument that she belonged to the particular
social group (“PSG”) of landowners in Michoacan, Mexico.
The BIA denied reconsideration because Cruz-Martinez forfeited this
argument by failing to exhaust it in her initial administrative appeal. See Matter of
O-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006). To exhaust an argument for protection
based on a PSG, a petitioner must “clearly indicate the exact delineation of any
[PSG] to which she claims to belong.” Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I&N Dec.
189, 191 (BIA 2018) (cleaned up). Cruz-Martinez’s administrative appeal brief
argued that she belonged to a PSG of landowners who refuse to support a particular
community self-defense group. The initial BIA decision rejected this proposed group
as lacking the requisite particularity and social distinction. Nowhere in Cruz-
Martinez’s administrative appeal brief did she clearly assert a PSG consisting of

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landowners without further qualification. While Cruz-Martinez did argue for the
non-qualified landowner PSG in her proceedings before the Immigration Judge
(“IJ”), the BIA was under no obligation to scour the administrative record for legal
claims which Cruz-Martinez could have but did not raise on appeal. It was thus not
an abuse of discretion for the BIA to conclude that its initial decision considered all
PSG arguments properly before it.
In any event, the original BIA decision identified alternate grounds for
upholding the IJ decision: there was no nexus between the harms Cruz-Martinez
suffered and her membership in any group. See Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526,
531-32 (BIA 2011). Since Cruz-Martinez’s motion to reconsider did not challenge
these alternate grounds, it could not have succeeded even if the BIA had erred in
refusing to consider the non-qualified landowner PSG.
II
Cruz-Martinez also argues that the BIA should have reconsidered her appeal
because the IJ decision and initial BIA decision ignored relevant evidence. See Cole
v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771-72 (9th Cir. 2011). But Cruz-Martinez points to no
indicia of ignoring relevant evidence such as “misstating the record” or “failing to
mention highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence.” Id. at 772. She argues
only that the IJ and BIA disregarded her testimony of government acquiescence
when, after discussing her testimony in detail, they concluded that there was “no

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evidence” and “no indication” of government acquiescence. In isolation, these
statements could be interpreted to mean that the IJ and BIA were ignoring Cruz-
Martinez’s testimony. But in context, they can reasonably be interpreted otherwise,
to mean that the BIA and IJ found Cruz-Martinez’s testimony credible as a statement
of her individual experience, but unpersuasive as an account of objective social
conditions. See Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1680 (2021) (distinguishing
credibility from factual accuracy). It was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA’s
denial of reconsideration so to construe the IJ and initial BIA decisions, and so to
reject Cruz-Martinez’s argument that its initial decision ignored relevant evidence.
* * *
The petition for review is DENIED.

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