Andrew J.j. Wolf v. JOSH TEWALT, Director IDOC

21-35282Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit15 de dez. de 2022

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANDREW J.J. WOLF,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOSH TEWALT, Director IDOC; BREE
DERRICK; CHAD PAGE; RANDY
VALLEY; AMANDA GENTRY; ROSS
CASTLETON; WALTER CAMPBELL,
“Wally”; KEITH YORDY, Warden;
TIMOTHY RICHARDSON; CHESTER
MARTIN; LUKE KORMYLO; MICHAEL
RICE; AMADA DIETZ; TYRELL DAVIS;
SUSAN WESSELS; AMANDA
HOTTINGER; NICK BAIRD,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-35282
D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00259-BLW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2022**
Before: WALLACE, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 15 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Idaho state prisoner Andrew J.J. Wolf appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v.
Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Wolf’s due process claim regarding his
placement and continued confinement in administrative segregation because Wolf
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was denied any procedural
protections that were due. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01
(9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472 (1995) (setting forth due process requirements for placement in administrative
segregation and continued segregated confinement).
The district court properly dismissed Wolf’s claim concerning the conditions
of confinement in administrative segregation because Wolf failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that the conditions “result[ed] in the denial of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wolf’s motion for
reconsideration because Wolf failed to establish any basis for such relief. See Sch.

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Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wolf’s request for
appointment of counsel because Wolf failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for
appointment of counsel).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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