Elena Livenson v. AERONAUTICAL RADIO, INC., Erroneously Sued As Rockwell Collins, Inc.

21-55800Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit15 de dez. de 2022

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELENA LIVENSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AERONAUTICAL RADIO, INC.,
Erroneously Sued As Rockwell Collins,
Inc.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
ROCKWELL COLLINS, INC., a
Delaware corporation doing business in
California,
Defendant.
Nos. 21-55800, 21-55888
D.C. No. 2:20-cv-09578-SB-SK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 16, 2022
Pasadena, California
FILED
DEC 15 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

-- 1 of 3 --

Before: WARDLAW and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,**
District Judge.
Elena Livenson appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (“ARINC”). Livenson worked for ARINC for twenty
years as a software engineer. She alleges that ARINC fired her in violation of
California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and the California
Family Rights Act (“CFRA”). Livenson suffers from migraines, anxiety, high
blood pressure, and an elevated heart rate. She claims that ARINC failed to
accommodate her disabilities and fired her for disability-related limitations.
We review “a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.”
Dep’t of Fair Emp. & Hous. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 736 (9th Cir.
2011). To do so, we “must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material
fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.”
Id. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Following the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
framework, the district court assumed that Livenson stated a prima facie case of
** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2

-- 2 of 3 --

disability discrimination. Next, the court found that ARINC articulated a
legitimate reason for Livenson’s termination: her failure to meet the terms of her
Performance Recovery Plan (“PRP”). We agree with the district court’s
conclusion that Livenson failed to raise a triable factual issue as to pretext.
Summary judgment was also appropriate for the FEHA failure-to-
accommodate and interactive process claims. The FEHA requires employers “to
make reasonable accommodation[s]” for a known mental disability, Cal. Gov’t.
Code § 12940(m)(1), and “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process”
with their employee to determine an effective reasonable accommodation, Cal.
Gov’t. Code § 12940(n). It is undisputed that ARINC accommodated Livenson by,
among other things, moving team meeting times to address her morning migraines,
moving the PRP deadlines to account for her medical leave, and approving
intermittent days off for health-related issues. We agree with the district court that
ARINC adequately engaged in the interactive process and provided the reasonable
accommodations that Livenson requested.
Livenson’s punitive damages claim fails with the underlying FEHA claims.
AFFIRMED.
3

-- 3 of 3 --

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.