Tariq Ahmad v. JIM FULKERSON; DOES, 1-10, inclusive

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TARIQ AHMAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JIM FULKERSON; DOES, 1-10, inclusive,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-17030
D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00717-MMD-CLB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2023**
Before: GRABER, PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges
Tariq Ahmad appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his diversity action arising out of a suit alleging commercial bribery and fraud. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack
of personal jurisdiction. CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 24 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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1073 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ahmad’s action for lack of personal
jurisdiction because Ahmad failed to allege sufficient claim-related contacts with
Nevada to provide the court with specific personal jurisdiction over defendant.
See id. at 1076-80 (discussing requirements for specific jurisdiction).
We do not consider Ahmad’s contentions regarding general jurisdiction
because they were raised for the first time on appeal. See Cold Mountain v.
Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In general, we do not consider an
issue raised for the first time on appeal.”); Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455
(9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a failure to object to a magistrate judge’s legal
conclusion is a factor to be weighed in considering the propriety of finding waiver
of an issue on appeal).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ahmad further
leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that a district court may deny leave to amend if
amendment would be futile).
We reject as unpersuasive Ahmad’s contention that his motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint rendered moot defendant’s motion to dismiss the

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first amended complaint.
AFFIRMED.

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