22-111•Sindy Jaquelin Coello- Valle v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General
22-111Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit14 de set. de 2023
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SINDY JAQUELIN COELLO-
VALLE; SCARLETH ABIGAIL
TOLEDO-COELLO; GENESIS
JAQUELIN TOLEDO-
COELLO; STALLIN ORLANDO
TOLEDO-COELLO,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-111
Agency Nos.
A209-241-759
A209-241-761
A209-241-760
A209-241-758
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 12, 2023
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, S.R. THOMAS and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
FILED
SEP 14 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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Sindy Jaquelin Coello-Valle and three of her minor children, natives and
citizens of Honduras, petition for review of a final order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision
denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction over this
timely petition for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we review the
BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo.
Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). Under the
substantial evidence standard, we will reverse a BIA finding only if the evidence
“compels a contrary conclusion.” Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir.
2010). We deny the petition for review.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and
withholding of removal relief. Applicants for asylum and withholding of removal
must show a nexus between the past or feared persecution and a protected ground
such as a particular social group (“PSG”). Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136,
1143 (9th Cir. 2021). For asylum, an applicant must show that membership in a
proposed PSG was a “central reason” for their persecutor’s motivation to harm. Id.
at 1143–44. A central reason is a but-for cause of the persecution. See id. at 1144.
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The nexus standard for withholding is a lower bar; the applicant must only show
that their PSG was “a reason” for the persecution. Id. at 1146.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Coello-Valle
failed to satisfy her burden of proof that she was persecuted or had a well-founded
fear of persecution “on account of” membership in her proposed PSGs of “family
of business owners” and “family of violent crime victims.” Coello-Valle testified
that her husband was extorted for a “war tax” because he had a taxi business and
was perceived to “work hard” and have money to pay. When her husband could
not pay the gang’s second demand, the gang violently attacked him and his co-
worker uncle, and began harassing Coello-Valle to disclose her husband’s location.
After her husband left for the United States, and it was clear the gang was not
going to get anything more from him, gang members turned their focus on Coello-
Valle and demanded that she pay the unpaid tax under threat of harm to her and her
children. When asked, Coello-Valle confirmed that the gang was pursuing her
because they thought she could pay the extortion: “Specifically, they imposed
those payments on me because they thought that perhaps we had money, since my
husband was in the United States, and that he had the amount of money to make
that payment, . . . and since we did have the other taxi – we were also working the
other taxi on the streets – that we had the money.”
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Here, the record supports the conclusion that Coello-Valle’s family was
targeted because the gang perceived that the family had money and could be
extorted. The gang made no references to the business or the family separate from
the gang’s interest in obtaining money. And its actions are likewise consistent
with pursuing its extortion objective. Thus, substantial evidence supports the
agency’s determination that the violence and threats inflicted by the gang were for
no reason other than that found by the agency—“their criminal desire to enrich
themselves by stealing money from [Coello-Valle] and her family.” See
Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Where the
record indicates that the persecutor’s actual motivation for threatening a person is
to extort money . . . , the record does not compel finding that the persecutor
threatened the target because of a protected characteristic such as family relation.”
(emphasis added)).
“The lack of a nexus to a protected ground is dispositive of [] asylum and
withholding of removal claims.” Riera–Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th
Cir. 2016). Therefore, we must deny the petition for review as to the asylum and
withholding claims.
2. We also deny the petition for review as to CAT relief. For
withholding of removal under CAT, Coello-Valle must show that it is “more likely
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than not . . . she would be tortured if removed” to Honduras. 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(c)(2). Torture is “more severe than persecution,” Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d
1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted), and the record does not compel the
conclusion that Coello-Valle will be tortured if she is returned to Honduras. Nor
does the record compel the conclusion that a government official would acquiesce
to any torture, as the gang member who threatened Coello-Valle was arrested and
is in prison, the family received some help from police officers, and Coello-Valle
was adamant that she was not prevented from filing a police report but simply
chose not to.
Given the resolution of these claims, we need not—and do not—reach any
other issue urged by the parties. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make
findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”
(quoting INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976))).
PETITION DENIED.
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