Ramon Valenzuela-Medina v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAMON VALENZUELA-MEDINA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-956
Agency No.
A200-693-129
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 6, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Ramon Valenzuela-Medina, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an
appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 8 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.
We review questions of law de novo and factual findings for substantial
evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (citations omitted). Under the substantial evidence standard, the agency’s
findings are conclusive unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted).
1. The agency properly denied statutory withholding of removal because
Valenzuela-Medina failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Further, substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination that Valenzuela-Medina failed to establish that
his experiences in Mexico rose to the level of past persecution. See Baghdasaryan
v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that an applicant bears the
burden of proving that past treatment rises to the level of persecution); see also
Fon v. Garland, 34 F.4th 810, 813 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2022) (discussing standard of
1 The BIA found the denial of asylum, CAT protection, voluntary removal,
and cancellation of removal uncontested and, therefore, did not further consider
these forms of relief. Valenzuela-Medina does not specifically address these forms
of relief in his brief. Therefore, any claims based on these forms of relief are
unexhausted and forfeited. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 423
(2023) (holding that, although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is
not jurisdictional, it is still subject to the rules regarding waiver and forfeiture).

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review). There is evidence that Valenzuela-Medina was indirectly threatened with
death after his brother was shot by unknown individuals whom Valenzuela-Medina
claimed were cartel members.2 That threat, however, was not combined with any
confrontation or mistreatment of Valenzuela-Medina. See Sharma v. Garland, 9
F.4th 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2021) (“We have repeatedly denied petitions for review
when, among other factors, the record did not demonstrate significant physical
harm.” (collecting cases)). The threat itself was not “so menacing as to cause
significant actual suffering or harm,” and the agency properly determined that it
did not constitute past persecution. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025,
1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that
Valenzuela-Medina did not establish an objectively reasonable fear of future
persecution. See Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1065. The threat was conveyed to
Valenzuela-Medina over twenty years ago, and Valenzuela-Medina did not know
the identity of his brother’s killers, or how they would recognize him if he returned
2 Valenzuela-Medina argues that the threats “were combined with the
murder of [his] brother” Roberto. Valenzuela-Medina does not cite record
evidence to support this assertion, and his merits hearing testimony states that his
brother was shot, not murdered. Valenzuela-Medina also asserts that the cartel
“was responsible for several murder attempts against the men in [his] family, many
who were brutally gunned down.” He does not point to record evidence to support
this assertion, and he testified before the IJ that his brother Roberto was the only
member of his family who was harmed.

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to Mexico. See id. (holding that the record did not compel a finding of future harm
when “decades” had passed since the petitioner’s interaction with the alleged
persecutors); see also Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that the possibility of a course of events without “specific evidence to
suggest” that the events will occur is too speculative to establish an objectively
reasonable fear of future persecution). The agency also found that Valenzuela-
Medina could reasonably relocate within Mexico, and Valenzuela-Medina does not
specifically challenge this dispositive determination. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(b)(3)(i); see Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir.
1996). The presence of cartel activity in Mexico generally is insufficient to show
that it would be unreasonable for Valenzuela-Medina to internally relocate. See
Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 648–49 (9th Cir. 2021).
2. Because Valenzuela-Medina failed to explain why he was eligible for
humanitarian asylum, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand to
the IJ for consideration of that form of relief when it had affirmed the IJ’s finding
that Valenzuela-Medina had not suffered past persecution. See Najmabadi v.
Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a motion to reopen must
establish the applicant’s prima facie eligibility for the relief requested); see also 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii).
PETITION DENIED.

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