Jose T. Vasquez v. District of Columbia

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued February 22, 2024 Decided August 9, 2024
No. 23-7050
JOSE T. VASQUEZ,
APPELLANT
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND RUBEN AGOSTO, OFFICER,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:17-cv-02194)
Creighton R. Magid argued the cause and filed the briefs
for appellant.
Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia,
argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were
Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General, Caroline S. Van Zile,
Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy

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Solicitor General, and Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor
General.
Before: WILKINS and RAO, Circuit Judges, and
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.
WILKINS, Circuit Judge: The Metropolitan Police
Department (“MPD”) has twice detained Jose Vasquez for one
reason: He has the same name and date of birth as another man
who is a wanted criminal. Of course, sharing a name and date
of birth with a wanted criminal is not a crime. So, Mr. Vasquez
sued the District of Columbia and one of its officers for
violations of his constitutional rights under Section 1983, and
the District of Columbia alone for negligence, malicious
prosecution, and false imprisonment.
The District Court disposed of the Section 1983 and
negligence claims at summary judgment, but the two other
common law claims went to trial where the jury held the
District of Columbia liable for false imprisonment, but not
malicious prosecution. Though the jury awarded Mr. Vasquez
$100,000 in damages for the false imprisonment claim, he
never received any payout. That is because the District Court
granted the District of Columbia’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, it granted
the District of Columbia’s motion for remittitur.
Mr. Vasquez now appeals. As our opinion details, we
affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment,
but vacate its order granting the District of Columbia’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law, and in the alternative
remittitur. In so doing, we reinstate the jury’s verdict and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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I.
For over forty years, a man named Jose Vasquez has
evaded prosecution in Will County, Illinois for murder.
Hoping to detain and prosecute Jose Vasquez, Will County has
entered two warrants into the National Crime Information
Center (“NCIC”) database, which allows police departments
across the country to access its warrants. One warrant charges
Jose Vasquez as a fugitive from justice, and links to the second
warrant (for murder), which underlies the fugitive from justice
charge. Accordingly, if an officer stops the Jose Vasquez listed
in the warrant, and has access to NCIC, they may detain him
and contact Will County so that it can extradite.
Of course, whether another police department should detain
a person based on the information provided by Will County
presupposes that Will County’s NCIC entries are accurate. But
for a long time, that was not the case. Indeed, from 2005
through 2013, the NCIC entry for one of the Will County
warrants contained an egregious error: it named Jose Vasquez
as the suspect, but the social security number and physical
description described a different Jose Vasquez, a man who lives
in Maryland and has never set foot in Will County, Illinois.
Unsurprisingly, Maryland police departments arrested and
detained the wrong Jose Vasquez pursuant to the Will County
warrant on a few occasions. So in 2013, Will County amended
its erroneous NCIC entry to include a new instruction: “DO
NOT DETAIN A VASQUEZ, JOSE [redacted birthday]
[Social Security number redacted] THIS IS NOT SUSPECT.”
Vasquez v. County of Will, No. 17-cv-02194, 2021 WL
4476766, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Vasquez I”). This
amendment seemingly made clear that Maryland’s Jose
Vasquez (the Plaintiff in this case) was not wanted in Will
County.

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Will County’s clarification aside, Mr. Vasquez was
detained twice more by MPD due to the Will County murder
and fugitive warrants. This appeal arises from those two
detentions.
A.
On October 23, 2016, Mr. Vasquez was stopped by Officer
Terence Sutton, an MPD officer, for a traffic violation.
Vasquez I, 2021 WL 4476766, at *2. During this traffic stop,
Officer Sutton searched the name “Jose Vasquez” in the NCIC
database; this search returned two contradictory entries. Id.
One entry returned a Will County warrant for Jose Vasquez for
a failure to appear based on the underlying homicide charge;
the name, date of birth, and social security number recorded in
the fugitive warrant for the wanted Jose Vasquez all matched
those belonging to plaintiff Mr. Vasquez. Id. The other NCIC
warrant entry, for the homicide charge, contained the message
saying “DO NOT DETAIN” the Jose Vasquez with the social
security number that matches plaintiff’s social security
number, because he is “NOT [the] SUSPECT.” Id.
Nevertheless, Officer Sutton claimed that he did not see the
“do not detain” message and arrested Mr. Vasquez. Id. And
following the arrest, every MPD officer involved in Mr.
Vasquez’s detention assumed that Mr. Vasquez was the Jose
Vasquez wanted in Will County.
The next day, MPD Officer Ernest Cole sent a teletype
message to Will County seeking to confirm that Will County
would extradite Mr. Vasquez. Id. This message did not include
Mr. Vasquez’s social security number. Id. After sending this
message, but before receiving a response from Will County,
Officer Cole initiated a fugitive criminal action against Mr.
Vasquez. Id.

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Then, five days after Officer Sutton arrested Mr. Vasquez,
yet another MPD officer, Officer Ruben Agosto, emailed the
Will County Sheriff’s Office to, once again, seek confirmation
that Will County would extradite Mr. Vasquez. Id. This email
included a photo of Mr. Vasquez along with his fingerprints.
Id. Within hours, Will County responded with a teletype
message that exonerated Mr. Vasquez and requested that MPD
release any holds it had on Mr. Vasquez. Id. Officer Agosto
did not see this message for another six days. Id.
Finally, on November 2, 2016—ten days after the initial
arrest—at Mr. Vasquez’s bond hearing, defense counsel alerted
the court that his client was not the Jose Vasquez wanted in
Will County. Id. In response, the court ordered the U.S.
Attorney’s Office to investigate Mr. Vasquez’s claim of
mistaken identity. Id. The very next day, Officer Agosto found
the Will County message requesting Mr. Vasquez’s release and
forwarded this message to the U.S. Attorney, which dismissed
the charges against Mr. Vasquez. Id.
The details of Mr. Vasquez’s eleven-day detention were
documented in a few ways. MPD gave Mr. Vasquez a PDID
number—a unique identifier that MPD gives to any person it
arrests and detains. J.A. 556–57. This allows MPD officers to
search detainees and review their past encounters with the
Department. J.A. 555, J.A. 560–62. Thus, in Mr. Vasquez’s
case, MPD now had a file containing his social security
number, fingerprints, and information from this arrest, and
eventual release from jail. MPD officers were also able to
access the details surrounding Mr. Vasquez’s bond hearing
through JUSTIS, a system created and maintained by the D.C.
Superior Court.

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B.
Mr. Vasquez was arrested again on March 3, 2017
following a traffic stop. This arrest was based on the same
erroneous NCIC entry that led to his November 2016 arrest.
This time, however, Secret Service—not MPD—handled the
traffic stop. Eventually, Secret Service dropped Mr. Vasquez
off at MPD’s Second District Precinct, thus, placing him in
MPD’s custody.
Mr. Vasquez vehemently protested his detention and
professed his innocence to the MPD officers who detained him.
Indeed, he alerted one officer to his social security number,
which did not match the number listed in the Will County
NCIC entry. J.A. 514, J.A. 517. But to no avail. The officer
dismissed his pleas and, instead, called him a liar and a
murderer. J.A. 517. Mr. Vasquez would, once again, remain
in MPD custody overnight. J.A. 521.
On the morning of March 4th, Officer Leroy Rollins, a
fugitive unit officer located in MPD headquarters, J.A. 731,
wrote the affidavit that supported Mr. Vasquez’s arrest as a
fugitive, J.A. 557–59. To prepare this affidavit, Officer Rollins
searched Mr. Vasquez in the NCIC database and noticed that
his social security number did not match the number on the
Will County warrant. J.A. 651–52. Officer Rollins testified
that he did not investigate further, but instead messaged Will
County asking whether its warrant for Jose Vasquez was still
active and if it would extradite. J.A. 662. This message to Will
County did not mention that Mr. Vasquez’s social security
number differed from the number on the Will County warrant.
J.A. 659–60. At his arraignment, that afternoon, Mr. Vasquez
was released after his attorney alerted the presiding judge that
MPD previously arrested and detained him based on this
mistaken identity a few months earlier. See Vasquez I, 2021

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WL 4476766, at * 2; Vasquez v. District of Columbia, No. 17-
cv-02194, 2023 WL 2682290, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2023)
(“Vasquez II”).
C.
Following the March 2017 detention, Mr. Vasquez sued; a
few of his claims are relevant to this appeal. Mr. Vasquez
brought constitutional claims arising under Section 1983
against Officer Agosto and the District of Columbia based on
the 2016 arrest. These claims did not survive summary
judgment. See Vasquez I, 2021 WL 4476766, at *8–10. Mr.
Vasquez also brought three common law claims (negligence,
false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution) against the
District of Columbia based on his 2017 arrest. The negligence
claim did not survive summary judgment, but the malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment claims went to trial. See
id. at *4–6.
The jury returned a mixed verdict. It ruled for Mr.
Vasquez on the false imprisonment claim, but it ruled for the
District of Columbia on malicious prosecution. On the former,
the jury awarded Mr. Vasquez $100,000. Vasquez II, 2023 WL
2682290, at *8. After the jury verdict, the District of Columbia
renewed its judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Vasquez’s false
imprisonment claim, and in the alternative moved for
remittitur. The District Court vacated the jury’s verdict and its
award, granting the District of Columbia’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, granting the
motion for remittitur. See id. at *9.
Mr. Vasquez appeals the grants of summary judgment as
to his constitutional claims, as well as the District Court’s order
granting the District of Columbia judgment as a matter of law
or, in the alternative, remittitur. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.

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II.
We begin with Mr. Vasquez’s respective Section 1983
claims against Officer Agosto and the District of Columbia.
We review the District Court’s grants of summary judgment de
novo. Lane v. District of Columbia, 887 F.3d 480, 487 (D.C.
Cir. 2018). As we explain, because both Defendants (the
movants below) demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and [they are] entitled to judgment as a
matter of law,” we affirm the District Court’s judgment. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A.
Mr. Vasquez advances a novel argument that Officer
Agosto unreasonably seized him in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. As best we understand, Mr. Vasquez contends
that an officer undertakes a Fourth Amendment duty to
conclusively determine whether a detainee is unlawfully seized
when the officer begins an investigation into the detainee’s
innocence within a certain time period. This duty is breached,
Mr. Vasquez’s argument continues, if the officer fails to
sufficiently monitor the investigation and, consequently,
ignores exculpatory evidence. Officer Agosto provides a
straightforward response: Qualified immunity forecloses Mr.
Vasquez’s claim.
“An official sued under [Section 1983] is entitled to
qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated
a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established
at the time of the challenged conduct.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). The
“clearly established” standard is quite demanding as it requires
a showing that “any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes
would have understood that he was violating” the plaintiff’s
constitutional right. Id. at 779. An official is said to have

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sufficient notice if there is “controlling authority” or “a robust
consensus of cases of persuasive authority,” id. at 780, that
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct “in the particular
circumstances that he or she faced,” id. at 779 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
The District Court agreed with Officer Agosto, and easily
disposed of this argument because Mr. Vasquez failed to cite a
single case “from the Supreme Court or this Circuit that would
hold an officer accountable in circumstances like those faced
by Officer Agosto.” Vasquez I, 2021 WL 4476766, at *7. So
too here.
Minutes into oral argument, Mr. Vasquez’s counsel
conceded that “there is strangely a paucity of case law on this
precise situation.” Oral Arg. 7:15. This concession kills Mr.
Vasquez’s appeal. There is simply no way that the proposed
theory of Fourth Amendment liability is “clearly established”
if, when asked to present one case in support of his theory,
counsel submits that no such case exists.
Mr. Vasquez’s briefing relies primarily on one case,
Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725 (6th Cir. 2006). But
Gregory does not come close to providing Officer Agosto with
sufficient notice that his conduct was unlawful. In Gregory, a
state police employee was alleged to have “intentionally
withheld exculpatory information in order to continue
Plaintiff’s detention without probable cause.” Id. at 751. But
here, Mr. Vasquez suggests that Officer Agosto negligently
failed to uncover the existence of readily available exculpatory
evidence. There is no way Officer Agosto, who is alleged to
have negligently investigated, was put on notice that his
conduct was unconstitutional because other state police
employees intentionally withheld exculpatory evidence to aid
a criminal prosecution.

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Therefore, Gregory’s facts are clearly distinguishable
from the facts that Mr. Vasquez alleges, and do not aid his
attempt to clear qualified immunity’s high bar. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts not to define clearly
established law at a high level of generality, since doing so
avoids the crucial question whether the official acted
reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.”
Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 779 (cleaned up). This instruction is
“especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where
… it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the
relevant legal doctrine … appl[ies] to the factual situation the
officer confronts.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)
(cleaned up). We are bound by, and necessarily heed, those
instructions here. The District Court correctly granted
qualified immunity to Officer Agosto.1
B.
Mr. Vasquez’s attempt to hold the District of Columbia
liable for alleged constitutional injuries similarly fails.
Municipal liability under Section 1983 is quite limited and
extends only to a local government’s official policies,
practices, or customs that are “responsible for a deprivation of
rights protected by the Constitution.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
Naturally, Monell liability begins with a “predicate
constitutional violation.” Lane, 887 F.3d at 488. Without this
1 In his reply brief, Mr. Vasquez argues that he need not provide a
robust authority of case law because the constitutional violation here
is patently obvious. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199
(2004) (recognizing that there are some cases where it is “obvious”
that the officer has violated a constitutional right); see also Taylor v.
Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8–9 (2020) (same). Arguments raised for the first
time on reply are forfeited; therefore, we do not address it here. See,
e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 1 F.4th 40, 46 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

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initial showing, “it is inconceivable that the city could be
liable.” Id. (cleaned up).
On appeal, Mr. Vasquez attacks two MPD policies: (1) its
protocols for handling teletype messages and (2) its protocols
(or lack thereof) for determining whether a person has been
correctly identified as a fugitive from justice. In so doing, Mr.
Vasquez attempts to make the general point that if MPD had
better policies and protocols in place, Mr. Vasquez would not
have been misidentified and wrongly detained. Maybe so. But
municipalities are not liable under Section 1983 for all “harm-
causing … policies,” and Mr. Vasquez does not cite to a single
case that explains how MPD’s alleged negligence is
unconstitutional. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 123 (1992).
Thus, we reiterate one of Lane’s closing takeaways, it is
“inconceivable” that a municipality is liable under Monell
where the plaintiff fails to show a “predicate constitutional
violation.” 887 F.3d at 488 (quoting City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). To the extent that Mr.
Vasquez alleges that the District of Columbia violated the
Fourth Amendment based on the actions of MPD officers, that
argument is foreclosed by Monell itself: “a municipality cannot
be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under
[Section] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436
U.S. at 691. Similarly, the invocation of the Fifth Amendment
in Mr. Vasquez’s complaint is unavailing because there is no
cognizable argument that demonstrates the Fifth Amendment’s
relevance to the facts Mr. Vasquez’s complaint alleges. The
District Court correctly granted the District of Columbia’s
motion for summary judgment.

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III.
Mr. Vasquez also appeals the District Court’s judgment as
a matter of law, which vacated the jury’s finding that the
District of Columbia was liable for false imprisonment. Mr.
Vasquez further asks that if we agree with him that the District
Court erred when it vacated the jury’s finding, we should also
reverse the District Court’s alternative grant of remittitur that
reduced the jury’s $100,000 award to $6,000. Here, we agree
with Mr. Vasquez.
A.
At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that Mr.
Vasquez had to establish two elements to prove his false
imprisonment claim: “(1) MPD officers detained [him] against
his will and (2) the detention was unlawful.” Vasquez II, 2023
WL 2682290, at *3 (internal quotations omitted). As to the
second element, the District Court further instructed the jury
that “false imprisonment can occur even if the confinement
began lawfully but has become unlawful over time.” Id. A
detention becomes unlawful over time, the instruction
continued, “when a defendant is under a duty to release the
plaintiff but does not do so.” Id. The refusal to release the
plaintiff “with the intention of confining the plaintiff is a
sufficient act of confinement to make the defendant liable for
false imprisonment.” Id.
The District Court then instructed the jury on the specific
circumstances in Mr. Vasquez’s case that would give rise to a
duty to release:
Whether MPD had a duty to release Mr. Vasquez
depends upon the belief of its officers that Mr.
Vasquez was the person named or otherwise
described in the Will County warrant with such

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sufficiency as to justify their belief that he was the
person wanted by Will County. If officers of the MPD
later learned that Mr. Vasquez was undoubtedly not
the person wanted by the Will County warrant, MPD
was required to release Mr. Vasquez unless he
objected to his release.
Id. The jury returned a verdict finding the District of Columbia
liable for false imprisonment and awarded Mr. Vasquez
$100,000 in damages. Id. at *1. This verdict, we have
repeatedly explained, will not be “lightly disturb[ed].” McGill
v. Muñoz, 203 F.3d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Muldrow v. Re-
Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Radtke v.
Lifecare Mgmt. Partners, 795 F.3d 159, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
Xereas v. Heiss, 987 F.3d 1124, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
“We review de novo a district court’s disposition of a
motion for judgment as a matter of law, in the sense that we
apply to the jury’s decision the same forgiving standard as did
the district court.” Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1344
(D.C. Cir. 1999). So as not to infringe on the jury’s functions,
when reviewing the entire record, we “must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and [we] may not
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000). Though we give “credence” to the “uncontradicted and
unimpeached” evidence from the movant, “at least to the extent
that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses,” we
“must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that
the jury is not required to believe.” Id. at 151; see also Zellner
v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 371 (2d Cir. 2007) (When ruling
on a judgment as a matter of law, “the court must bear in mind
that the jury is free to believe part and disbelieve part of any
witness’s testimony.”). Under this standard, “[j]udgment as a
matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence and all

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reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-
sided that reasonable men and women could not have reached
a verdict in plaintiff’s favor.” McGill, 203 F.3d at 845 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S. Const.
amend. VII (“no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law”).
Start with Officer Rollins’s testimony, the officer who
prepared the affidavit that supported the charge against Mr.
Vasquez as “a fugitive from the State of Illinois.” J.A. 649.
Officer Rollins told the jury that before he prepares an
affidavit, he runs the person’s name through NCIC to see “if
that person, in fact, has a warrant that the agency had charged
him with.” J.A. 707. Officer Rollins further testified that he
was aware that the person wanted in Will County had a
different social security number from the one listed in Mr.
Vasquez’s arrest packet at the time Officer Rollins prepared the
affidavit. J.A. 650–51; see also J.A. 357 (Officer Rollins’s
affidavit explaining that he verified the warrant through
NCIC). And notably, Officer Rollins was aware of the
differing social security numbers because he printed a report
from Cobalt, an internal MPD system, that contained
information about Mr. Vasquez. J.A. 651.
Despite noticing the difference in social security numbers,
Officer Rollins told the jury that he did not bother to further
investigate. J.A. 652. That is because, in Officer Rollins’s
view, a difference in social security numbers did not “raise a
red flag” or demonstrate that he was detaining the wrong Jose
Vasquez. J.A. 651–52.
In finding the District of Columbia liable for false
imprisonment, the jury was free not to credit Officer Rollins’s
testimony about the significance of the social security number

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mismatch. To the jury, the social security numbers could have
done far more than raise a red flag—they could have
undoubtedly demonstrated Mr. Vasquez’s innocence.
Therefore, we must ask a simple question: Was it reasonable
for the jury to find that Officer Rollins undoubtedly knew that
Mr. Vasquez was not wanted in Will County because his social
security number differed from the number listed in the warrant?
We think so. The jury verdict here was consistent with
federal law, which recognizes that a social security number is
a “means of identification.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7). Indeed,
numerous courts have ruled that a social security number is
“unique and therefore sufficient alone to identify a specific
individual.” United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230, 234 (4th
Cir. 2008); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 710 (1986);
Baysal v. Midvale Indem. Co., 78 F.4th 976, 979 (7th Cir.
2023); Tschida v. Motl, 924 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 2019).
Given the commonly understood importance of social security
numbers for identifying individuals, it would have been
reasonable for the jury to conclude that Mr. Vasquez’s social
security number was proof of his identity.
Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably found that
Officer Rollins undoubtedly knew Mr. Vasquez was not
wanted in Will County when he learned that Mr. Vasquez’s
social security number was not the same as the social security
number listed on the Will County warrant. Of course, in his
testimony, Officer Rollins attempted to wriggle out of the
straightforward conclusion that a person with a particular social
security number is not the same person as someone with a
different social security number, but the jury was not required
to credit his equivocation. We disagree with the District
Court’s reasoning given in support of its judgment as a matter
of law for three reasons.

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First, the District Court reasoned that “a mere difference
in Social Security numbers” could not mean that “Officer
Rollins undoubtedly knew that Plaintiff was not the Jose T.
Vasquez described in the Will County warrant and thus had a
duty to release him.” Vasquez II, 2023 WL 2682290, at *5.
But whether this difference is “mere,” or significant, is a factual
judgment that the jury, and the jury alone, must make. Here,
the jury could have reasonably found that this was no “mere”
difference—it was determinative; the District Court’s opposing
view substituted its judgment for the jury’s and encroached on
the jury’s functions.
Second, as the District Court saw it, “Plaintiff presented
no evidence to undermine the reasonableness of Officer
Rollins’s reliance on the Secret Service’s confirmation of
Plaintiff as the person wanted by Will County.” Id. Here too,
the District Court substituted its judgment for the jury’s and,
by extension, encroached on the jury’s fact-finding duties. In
ruling for Mr. Vasquez, the jury had the opportunity to consider
whether Officer Rollins’s reliance on Secret Service’s
confirmation was reasonable when he had his own
confirmation that Mr. Vasquez was not wanted in Will County
based on the difference in social security numbers.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that confirms
what Secret Service knew about Mr. Vasquez other than the
fact that he shared a birthdate and name with the Jose Vasquez
wanted in Will County. Thus, the jury could have reasonably
placed little weight on Secret Service’s confirmation that Mr.
Vasquez was the Jose Vasquez wanted in Will County.
Finally, to the extent that the District Court “buttressed”
its decision to overturn the verdict based on the jury’s finding
for the District of Columbia on Mr. Vasquez’s malicious
prosecution charge, we disagree that the verdicts were fatally
inconsistent. Id. at *6. In a false imprisonment claim “neither

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malice nor wrongful intent are controlling considerations” and
“such allegations, insofar as they refer to false arrest or false
imprisonment are mere surplusage.” Clarke v. District of
Columbia, 311 A.2d 508, 511 (D.C. 1973); see also Marshall
v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 1374, 1380 (D.C. 1978)
(“[M]alice is not [required]” to prove false imprisonment.). To
the contrary, the jury was instructed that Mr. Vasquez could
prevail on his malicious prosecution claim only if “Officer
Rollins acted with malice.” J.A. 964. The jury could
reasonably have found that while Officer Rollins undoubtedly
knew that Mr. Vasquez was not wanted in Will County, his
filing of the fugitive charge was not done with malicious intent.
Accordingly, the jury’s finding for Mr. Vasquez is reinstated,
and we vacate the District Court’s order granting judgment as
a matter of law.
B.
In the alternative, the District Court granted the District of
Columbia’s motion for remittitur and reduced the jury’s award
from $100,000 to $6,000. Vasquez II, 2023 WL 2682290, at
*9. Though we generally review the District Court’s decisions
on remittitur for abuse of discretion, “a more searching inquiry
is required” where, as here, the District Court reduces the jury’s
award. See Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018,
1023 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered
Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). That is
because when judges modify a jury’s verdict, we risk
“encroach[ing] on the jury’s important fact-finding function.”
Id. (quoting Vander Zee v. Karabatsos, 589 F.2d 723, 729
(D.C. Cir. 1978)); see also Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co.,
409 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“we must consider that the
agency to whom the Constitution allocates the fact-finding
function in the first instance—the jury—has evaluated the facts

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differently”). We conclude that the District Court overstepped
its bounds in this instance.
A 94% reduction of a jury award is a vast exercise of
discretion that must be supported with ample justifications.
Here, the crux of the District Court’s analysis centered on
damages awarded by other juries that considered somewhat
similar facts. Vasquez II, 2023 WL 2682290, at *9. Critically,
however, none of the proffered cases were truly comparable,
because none were described as involving plaintiffs who would
have been, like Mr. Vasquez, particularly traumatized by
another false imprisonment due to his past wrongful arrests.
See J.A. 518–22. Here, the jury was free to consider such
evidence. See J.A. 966 (instructing the jury that it could
consider how Mr. Vasquez’s “prior arrest and detention in 2016
by MPD affected [him] on March 3rd and 4th of 2017.”).
Furthermore, the jury could also rightly consider the
increased emotional harm caused by the fact that Mr.
Vasquez’s protestations of innocence did not just go unheeded;
they were mocked with the response that he was a “liar” and a
“murderer.” J.A. 515–16, 519. Indeed, the jury was instructed
that “[e]lements to consider when deciding a damages award
include any mental pain and suffering, fear, inconvenience,
indignity, insult, humiliation, or embarrassment that Mr.
Vasquez proves he suffered directly because of defendant’s
conduct.” J.A. 967. The jury could have reasonably found that
the callous actions and stinging epithets of District of Columbia
officials proved each and every one of those elements.
Though the District of Columbia claims that actions taken
before Officer Rollins saw the mismatched social security
numbers are irrelevant to damages, the jury could have
reasonably found that those actions aggravated the emotional
injuries caused by the later-occurring wrongful detention, as

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they were instructed to that effect regarding evidence of his
2016 wrongful detention. J.A. 966. Other than a passing
reference to emotional harm, the District Court focused
exclusively on the five-hour length of wrongful detention as the
basis for damages, and did not discuss at all the evidence of Mr.
Vasquez’s frustration or the police officers’ mocking when
granting remittitur. It is well settled that “a decision maker
abuses its discretion if it fails to consider a relevant factor.”
Amador Cnty. v. Dep’t of Interior, 772 F.3d 901, 904 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
Last, as we have previously explained, “it is awkward to
discuss the size of an award through comparison with past
decisions.” Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1127 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (quoting Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 16 (Wyo.
1980)). Thus, district courts must proceed with caution when
comparing jury awards “[b]ecause of the unique circumstances
of each case as well as the adjustments which would
necessarily have to be made for inflation.” Id. (quoting
Mariner, 610 P.2d at 16)). Further, “[a] court must be
especially hesitant to disturb a jury’s determination of damages
in cases involving intangible and non-economic injuries.”
Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1024.
Here, where the District Court failed to adequately
consider all of the elements of damages that the jury could have
properly relied upon to reach its verdict, where the damages
were almost exclusively non-economic and thus particularly
within the province of the jury’s subjective judgment, and
where the amount of the damages award is not so great as to
“shock the conscience,” the granting of remittitur was an abuse
of discretion. See Doe v. Binker, 492 A.2d 857, 863–64 (D.C.
1985).

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IV.
To conclude, we affirm the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment to Officer Agosto and the District of
Columbia. But we vacate the District Court’s judgment as a
matter of law and alternative grant of remittitur as to Mr.
Vasquez’s false imprisonment claim and remand for
reinstatement of the jury’s verdict. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(2);
Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 323 n.4
(1967); see also Taylor, 409 F.2d at 146, 149.
So ordered.

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