Michael Hill v. United States Department of the Interior

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued December 10, 2024 Decided August 19, 2025
No. 24-5011
MICHAEL HILL, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:22-cv-01781)
Andrea M. Seielstad argued the cause for appellants. With
her on the briefs was Thomas E. Luebben.
Mary Gabrielle Sprague, Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief
were Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General, and John L.
Smeltzer, Attorney.
Before: MILLETT and RAO, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

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RAO, Circuit Judge: In the arid American West, conflicts
frequently arise over water rights. This case concerns a dispute
over such rights between the Crow (Apsáalooké) Tribe, the
state of Montana, and the United States. After decades of
negotiations and litigation, the dispute was resolved in the
Crow Tribe-Montana Compact, which Congress ratified in
2010. Pursuant to the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act,
the Tribe and tribal members who own reservation land held in
trust by the United States waive any existing water rights in
exchange for defined water rights and hundreds of millions of
dollars in federal funds for water infrastructure projects.
Plaintiffs (“Allottees”) own trust allotments on the Crow
Reservation. Dissatisfied with the bargain struck by the
Compact and the Settlement Act, and the representation they
received in those negotiations, they seek to restore their
previous water rights. In this suit, Allottees challenge the
Secretary of the Interior’s publication of a “Statement of
Findings,” upon which the Settlement Act and the waiver of
their water rights became effective. Allottees allege the
Secretary’s action was in excess of statutory authority,
breached the United States’ trust obligations, and violated the
Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed Allottees’
complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
I.
A.
The water rights at issue here have a long history. For
centuries, the Crow Tribe has inhabited a stretch of land that
now includes the state of Montana. In 1868, the Tribe and the
United States entered the second and final Treaty of Fort
Laramie, which updated the borders of the Crow Indian
Reservation along the Montana-Wyoming border. See Treaty
with the Crow Indians art. II, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649, 650.

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Congress later allotted Reservation land to individual members
of the Tribe, to be held in trust by the United States for twenty-
five years. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24
Stat. 388, 389; Crow Allotment Act of 1920, ch. 224, §§ 1, 13,
41 Stat. 751, 751, 756; see also Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 548 (1981). At the conclusion of twenty-five years,
the United States was to convey to the allottees full title to the
land “by patent … in fee,” lifting the restrictions on alienation
that encumbered the land while held in trust. General Allotment
Act, § 5, 24 Stat. at 389; see also Crow Allotment Act, § 13, 41
Stat. at 756. Congress eventually ended the allotment system
and provided that title to allotted land that had not yet passed
out of trust was to be held indefinitely in trust by the United
States on behalf of the allottees. Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (now codified at 25
U.S.C. § 5101); see also United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.
535, 540–41 (1980). Today, Crow Reservation land generally
falls into three categories: land held in trust for the Tribe, land
held in trust for individual allottees, and land owned in fee
patent by Indians and non-Indians.
Before the 2010 Settlement Act, the Crow Tribe and
individual allottees held reserved water rights dating to 1868,
when the Crow Reservation was created. See Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1908); United States v. Powers,
305 U.S. 527, 532–33 (1939) (holding that the 1868 Treaty of
Fort Laramie creating the Crow Reservation reserved tribal
water “for the equal benefit of tribal members” such that when
Reservation land was allotted to individual Indians, “the right
to use some portion of tribal waters essential for cultivation
passed to the owners”). These so-called Winters rights are
treated as having taken effect on the date the reservation was
established and therefore are senior in priority to any water
rights accruing after 1868. See Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128, 138 (1976).

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Faced with increasing water scarcity, the Crow Tribe has
been part of ongoing disputes with Montana and the federal
government over its water rights. In 1975, the United States
filed a lawsuit on the Crow Tribe’s behalf to determine the
Tribe’s water rights. United States v. Big Horn Low Line Canal
Company, No. 75-cv-34 (D. Mont., filed April 17, 1975); see
also Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-901 (1999) (recounting
litigation history). Over the next two decades, the Crow Tribe,
Montana, and the United States negotiated over the water rights
of the Tribe and individual allottees, with the United States
representing the allottees as trustee.
The parties agreed to the Crow Tribe-Montana Compact in
1999. See Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-901 (“Compact”). The
Compact sets forth a “Tribal Water Right,” which includes the
right of the Tribe and individual allottees to divert, use, and
store water from sources on the Reservation. Id. art. II, § 30;
art. III. The Secretary of the Interior is charged with
administering and enforcing the Tribal Water Right until the
Tribe develops a “Tribal [W]ater [C]ode.” Id. art. IV, § A.2.b.
The Compact also requires the Tribe’s Water Resources
Department and the United States to provide Montana “a report
listing all current uses of the Tribal Water Right” within one
year of the Compact’s ratification by the Montana legislature.
Id. art. IV, § E.2 (“Current Use List”).
In 2010, Congress ratified the Compact in the Crow Tribe
Water Rights Settlement Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-291, 124
Stat. 3097 (“Settlement Act”). The Settlement Act codifies the
tribal water rights established in the Compact, which are to “be
held in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the
Tribe and the allottees.” Id. § 403(c)(1); see also id.
§§ 403(17), 407(b). Under the Act, allottees are “entitled to a
just and equitable allocation of water for irrigation purposes,”
to “be satisfied from the tribal water rights” pursuant to the

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Tribal Water Code. Id. § 407(d)(2)–(3), (f). In exchange for
these codified rights and hundreds of millions of dollars in
federal funding for tribal water projects, the Tribe and allottees
agreed to release all other water rights claims. Id. §§ 405, 406,
409(a), 410, 414.
Waiver of prior water rights is effectuated when the
Secretary of Interior publishes a “[S]tatement of [F]indings”
certifying that seven statutory conditions have been met. Id.
§ 410(b), (e). The Settlement Act provides for its automatic
repeal should the Secretary fail to publish its Statement of
Findings by March 31, 2016, or by an “extended date agreed to
by the Tribe and the Secretary.” Id. § 415.
On March 21, 2016, the Tribal Chairman of the Crow
Tribe agreed to extend the deadline for three months. The
Secretary published the Statement of Findings within the
agreed to deadline extension. 81 Fed. Reg. 40,720 (June 22,
2016).
B.
Nearly six years after the Secretary published the
Statement of Findings, Allottees filed this suit against the
United States. Allottees are Crow Tribe members whose land
is held in trust by the United States, members who own former
trust allotments in fee patent, and an association that represents
Crow trust allotment landowners. As relevant to this appeal,
Allottees alleged the Government acted in excess of statutory
authority by publishing the Statement of Findings after the
statutory deadline, breached trust duties owed to Allottees, and
violated the Fifth Amendment. They sought declaratory relief
stating that the publication of the Statement of Findings was
void and that the Settlement Act was automatically repealed.

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The district court concluded none of Allottees’ allegations
stated a claim for which relief could be granted and dismissed
the complaint. Allottees timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To
withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). We review de novo the
district court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a
claim. Frederick Douglass Found., Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 82 F.4th 1122, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2023). “At this stage,
we construe the complaint liberally, granting [Allottees] the
benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.” Id. (cleaned up).
III.
Allottees first claim the Settlement Act never went into
effect because the Statement of Findings was published after
the Act’s deadline had passed. Although the Secretary and the
Tribal Chairman had agreed to extend the statutory deadline,
Allottees contend that the Tribal Chairman lacked authority to
agree to the extension. Allottees maintain there was no valid
extension “agreed to by the Tribe and the Secretary” as
required by the Act, and so the Secretary’s publication was
without legal effect and the Act was automatically repealed on
March 31, 2016. Settlement Act, § 415, 124 Stat. at 3121.
Because the Settlement Act does not provide a private
cause of action, we construe this claim as an allegation that, by
publishing the Statement of Findings after the deadline, the
Secretary acted in excess of statutory authority in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2);

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Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230
n.4 (1986) (explaining that in the absence of a private cause of
action in the statute, plaintiffs “may avail themselves of the
right of action created by the APA” unless “clear and
convincing evidence” demonstrates a “legislative intention to
preclude review”).
A.
As a threshold matter, we find that the complaint
challenges final agency action reviewable under the APA. 5
U.S.C. § 704 (providing for judicial review of “final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court”).
For purposes of the APA, agency action is final when it
“mark[s] the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking
process” and is an action “by which rights or obligations have
been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (cleaned up).
Allottees’ complaint challenges the validity of the
Statement of Findings, not just the deadline extension as the
Government contends. The complaint states, for instance, that
the Settlement Act “was automatically repealed, effective the
day after the deadline, because the Secretary did not lawfully
publish the Statement of Findings ‘not later than March 31,
2016, or the extended date agreed to by the Tribe and the
Secretary.’” Amend. Compl. ¶ 148 (emphasis added).
Moreover, in the prayer for relief, the complaint requests a
declaratory judgment “that the Secretary’s publication in the
Federal Register of the Enforceability Date of the 2010 Crow
Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act is void and unenforceable.”
Id. ¶ A. Construed liberally, the complaint is fairly read as
arguing the Statement of Findings is invalid because it was
issued after the statutory deadline.

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As the parties agree, the Statement of Findings constitutes
final agency action. It is the completion of the Secretary’s
statutory obligation under the Settlement Act, and it alters
Allottees’ legal rights by triggering the waiver of their Winters
rights. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78. Allottees challenge the
validity of the Statement of Findings, which is a final agency
action amenable to judicial review under the APA.
B.
Allottees maintain the Secretary had no authority to
publish the Statement of Findings three months after the
statutory deadline because the Tribal Chairman lacked
authority to agree to a deadline extension on behalf of the
Tribe. The Settlement Act requires the Secretary to publish the
Statement of Findings “not later than March 31, 2016, or the
extended date agreed to by the Tribe and the Secretary.”
Settlement Act, § 415, 124 Stat. at 3121. If no Statement is
published by this date, or an agreed upon extended date, then
the Act is automatically repealed. Id. According to Allottees,
the Crow Constitution vests the authority to extend this
deadline exclusively with the Crow Tribal General Council1
and the Crow Legislature. Allottees contend there was no valid
extension agreement between the Secretary and “the Tribe,”
and therefore the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of
Findings three months after the statutory deadline was without
force of law, and the Act was automatically repealed.
When reviewing the federal government’s decision to
negotiate or enter into agreements with Indian tribes, “we owe
1 The General Council is the “governing body of the Crow Tribe”
and sits above all three branches of the Crow government established
in the Crow Constitution. Const. and Bylaws of the Crow Tribe of
Indians art. I. The Council is comprised of all adult Tribe members
eligible to vote. Id.

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deference to the judgment of the Executive Branch as to who
represents a tribe.” Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Salazar, 678
F.3d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The federal courts have long
acknowledged that in matters of tribal recognition, courts
“follow the action of the executive and other political
departments …, whose more special duty it is to determine
such affairs.” United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407,
419 (1866). And by statute, the Secretary of the Interior “has
the power to manage ‘all Indian affairs and [] all matters
arising out of Indian relations.’” California Valley Miwok
Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d 1262, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2) (alterations in original). As such, when
disputes arise as to which entity represents a tribe, we will
uphold the Secretary’s interpretation of tribal law to determine
who represents the tribe so long as that interpretation is
reasonable. See Cayuga Nation v. Bernhardt, 374 F. Supp. 3d
1, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2019) (upholding as “reasonable” the federal
government’s conclusion that, under tribal law, one faction was
the tribal governing body for purposes of federal contracting).
We conclude the Secretary reasonably determined that the
Tribal Chairman’s consent was sufficient to extend the
deadline for publishing the Statement of Findings. The
Settlement Act does not specify which tribal entity or
representative may represent the Tribe in agreeing to a deadline
extension. Instead, the Act defines the “Tribe” merely as “the
Crow Tribe of Indians of the State of Montana on behalf of
itself and its members (but not its members in their capacities
as allottees).” Settlement Act, § 403(18), 124 Stat. at 3099.
Under the Crow Constitution, the Tribal Chairman is the head
of the Crow Tribe’s Executive Branch, which is vested with
broad authority to “represent the Crow Tribe of Indians in
negotiation with Federal, State and local governments and
other agencies … in matters of welfare, education, recreation,
social services and economic development.” Const. and

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Bylaws of the Crow Tribe of Indians art. IV, § 3(a). While the
Statement of Findings has important legal consequences,
agreement to the deadline extension did not alter these legal
consequences or substantively affect the Crow’s rights, and so
was a purely ministerial act between the Secretary and the
Tribe.
Given the terms of the Act and the allocation of authority
under the Crow Constitution, it was entirely reasonable for the
Secretary to conclude that an agreement to extend the deadline
for publishing the Statement of Findings falls within the
Chairman’s broad grant of authority to represent the Tribe in
negotiations with the federal government.
C.
Allottees raise several arguments to rebut this
straightforward conclusion, but none undermine the
reasonableness of the Secretary’s determination that the Tribal
Chairman could provide the necessary consent for the deadline
extension.
Allottees do not allege that the Chairman is not the
legitimate head of the Tribe’s Executive Branch. Instead, they
claim that under the Crow Constitution, authority to agree to an
extension resides exclusively with the Crow Tribal General
Council and the Tribal Legislature, not the Chairman. Allottees
point out that the Crow Constitution gives the Legislative
Branch the power “to grant final approval or disapproval of
items negotiated by the Executive Branch … pertinent to the
sale, disposition, lease or encumbrance of Tribal lands,
interests in lands or mineral assets.” Const. and Bylaws of the
Crow Tribe of Indians art. V, § 2(d). This provision, however,
does not speak to the authority of the Tribal Chairman to agree
to a ministerial matter with the representative of another
sovereign. In agreeing to a deadline extension for the Statement

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of Findings, the Chairman was not agreeing to any substantive
disposition of the Tribe’s rights, which were already settled by
the Compact.
Allottees next argue a resolution by the Tribal Legislature
settles the question of the Tribal Chairman’s authority.2 In
2012, after the Settlement Act was enacted, but before
publication of the Statement of Findings, the Tribal Chairman
signed a document purporting to waive all claims to water not
provided for in the Settlement Act. The Crow Legislature
passed a resolution in protest that stated: “[N]o future waivers
or releases of Crow tribal claims shall be authorized … when
signed by a single Crow tribal member, even if the Executive
Branch Chairman, unless specific Crow tribal constitutional or
tribal statutory authority can be cited.” J.A. 69. According to
Allottees, this resolution should have put the Government “on
clear notice” that the Chairman could not unilaterally agree to
the deadline extension. But the resolution does not apply here,
because the deadline extension does not “waive or release” any
Tribal claims. Rather, the Chairman merely effectuated the
Settlement Act when he agreed to extend the deadline for the
Secretary to take a specific action required by the Settlement
Act.
2 Allottees gesture at a second statute by the Tribal Legislature,
which they maintain sheds light on the Tribal Chairman’s lack of
authority. But that statute simply “establish[es] and affirm[s] … the
lawful procedure for” ratification votes, including for the Compact
and the Settlement Act. CLB No. 2011-03, Preamble. This statute
specifies that ratification votes are only for “federal or Crow tribal
law which requires a majority vote of the Crow tribal membership.”
Id. at § 3(a) (emphasis added). A ratification vote already occurred
for the Compact and Settlement Act, and CLB No. 2011-03 nowhere
suggests that every act effectuating an already ratified statute
requires yet another ratification vote.

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Allottees do not identify any source of Crow legal
authority that undermines the Secretary’s reasonable
conclusion that the Chairman, the head of the Crow Executive
Branch, had authority to agree to an extension for publishing
the Statement of Findings. Because Allottees have not
plausibly alleged the extension was invalid, they have not
stated a claim that the Statement of Findings was published
without statutory authority.
IV.
Allottees next claim that the Secretary’s publication of the
Statement of Findings breached the Government’s trust duties
to protect their Winters rights. To maintain a breach of trust
claim against the United States, Allottees must (1) identify a
source of law creating specific fiduciary duties for the
Government, and (2) plausibly allege “that the Government has
failed faithfully to perform those duties.” United States v.
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003). Although the
Settlement Act creates trust duties, Allottees have failed to
plausibly allege the Government violated any specific duty.
A.
While there exists “a general trust relationship between the
United States and the Indian people,” this “bare” trust
relationship does not create legally enforceable fiduciary
responsibilities. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564
U.S. 162, 173–77 (2011) (cleaned up). Rather, because the
United States is a sovereign, it “assumes Indian trust
responsibilities only to the extent it expressly accepts those
responsibilities” in some positive law source. Id. at 177. Only
specific trust obligations established by “the text of a treaty,
statute, or regulation” may be judicially enforced against the
United States government. Arizona v. Navajo Nation, 143
S. Ct. 1804, 1813 (2023). To create an enforceable fiduciary

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duty, a law must establish specific government responsibilities
or the government must otherwise “assume[] … elaborate
control” over the trust assets. United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 222, 225 (1983); see also United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2003).
The Settlement Act creates specific trust duties for the
Government. The Act contains express fiduciary language and
identifies the Tribe and allottees as beneficiaries, providing that
“[t]he tribal water rights (1) shall be held in trust by the United
States for the use and benefit of the Tribe and the allottees in
accordance with this section; and (2) shall not be subject to
forfeiture or abandonment.” Settlement Act, § 407(c), 124 Stat.
at 3104. Moreover, the Act imposes several discrete
responsibilities on the United States. The Secretary is charged
with helping to carry out the “Rehabilitation and Improvement
of Crow Irrigation Project,” designing and constructing
features of the comprehensive water system, protecting the
water rights of allottees, administering the tribal water right
until the Tribal Water Code is enacted, and administering the
“Crow Settlement Fund.” Id. §§ 405–07, 411, 124 Stat. at
3100–06, 3113. These specific duties suffice to establish a trust
relationship.
B.
Although the Settlement Act establishes certain fiduciary
duties, Allottees fail to state a claim for breach of trust because
they do not plausibly allege the Government breached any duty
established by the Act. The complaint alleges the Statement of
Findings could not be published before the promulgation of a
Current Use List and Tribal Water Code. Allottees contend
they have lost their valuable Winters rights but have not yet
received any clearly defined water rights in their place. The
Government has thus breached its fiduciary duties, placing

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Allottees’ “water rights in limbo” and reducing their market
value.
But the Settlement Act does not impose a duty on the
United States to ensure the Current Use List and Tribal Water
Code are completed before the Secretary publishes the
Statement of Findings. The Act directs the Secretary to confirm
that seven specific conditions have been satisfied and then
publish those findings in the Federal Register.3 See Settlement
Act, § 410(e), 124 Stat. at 3112. None of these seven conditions
includes the preparation of the Current Use List or enactment
of the Tribal Water Code.
Finding that the seven statutory conditions were met, the
Secretary published the required Statement. Allottees have not
3 The Secretary must publish “a statement of findings that (A)(i) the
Montana Water Court has issued a final judgment and decree
approving the Compact; or (ii) if the Montana Water Court is found
to lack jurisdiction, the district court of jurisdiction has approved the
Compact as a consent decree and such approval is final; (B) all of the
funds made available under subsections (c) through (f) of section 414
have been deposited in the Fund; (C) the Secretary has executed the
agreements with the Tribe required by sections 405(a) and 406(a);
(D) the State of Montana has appropriated and paid into an interest-
bearing escrow account any payments due as of the date of enactment
of this Act to the Tribe under the Compact; (E)(i) the Tribe has
ratified the Compact by submitting this title and the Compact to a
vote by the tribal membership for approval or disapproval; and (ii)
the tribal membership has voted to approve this title and the Compact
by a majority of votes cast on the day of the vote, as certified by the
Secretary and the Tribe; (F) the Secretary has fulfilled the
requirements of section 408(a); and (G) the waivers and releases
authorized and set forth in subsection (a) have been executed by the
Tribe and the Secretary.” Settlement Act, § 410(e), 124 Stat. at 3112.

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plausibly alleged that this was a breach of any fiduciary duty
established by the Act.4
V.
Finally, we consider Allottees’ allegations that the
Secretary’s publication of the Statement of Findings violated
their Fifth Amendment rights. Here, too, we conclude that
Allottees have failed to state a claim.
A.
Allottees first contend that the publication of the Statement
of Findings was an unconstitutional taking of their water rights.
Allottees urge this court to read their complaint as stating a
claim under the Takings Clause. We are skeptical that the
complaint’s stray references to “expropriation” suffice to assert
a takings claim. But we need not dwell on that issue because
even assuming the complaint adequately alleges a taking,
Allottees have expressly waived any claims for damages and
have not attempted to justify their request for “declaratory and
equitable relief.” Appellant Br. 34.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that
no “private property” may “be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. A taking may occur
when the government “physically acquires private property for
a public use,” or when the government “imposes regulations
that restrict an owner’s ability to use his own property.” Cedar
Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (2021).
4 Allottees also allege the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of
Findings without first ensuring the publication of a Current Use List
and promulgation of a Tribal Water Code violated the APA. Because
this argument is a repackaging of Plaintiffs’ breach of trust claims,
we similarly reject it.

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The presumptive remedy for an alleged federal taking is
monetary relief. Under the Tucker Act, an individual who
claims the United States has taken his property may seek
compensation in the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1). “The Tucker Act … provides the standard
procedure for bringing [Fifth Amendment takings] claims.”
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170
(2019).
Because monetary compensation under the Tucker Act
will generally provide an adequate remedy at law, equitable
relief typically is not available for takings claims. See
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984)
(holding “[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged
taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by
law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the
sovereign subsequent to the taking”). The Supreme Court
recently reiterated that because the federal government
“provide[s] just compensation remedies to property owners
who have suffered a taking, equitable relief is generally
unavailable. As long as an adequate provision for obtaining just
compensation exists, there is no basis to enjoin the
government’s action effecting a taking.” Knick, 139 S. Ct. at
2176.
“Declaratory relief, like other forms of equitable relief, is
discretionary.” Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Meese, 939 F.2d 1011,
1019 (D.C. Cir. 1991). And when declaratory relief functions
like an injunction, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that
equitable relief is justified. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66, 68–74 (1971) (analyzing request for declaratory relief
under “the same equitable principles relevant to the propriety
of an injunction” because “[o]rdinarily … the practical effect
of the two forms of relief will be virtually identical”).

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The Allottees are clearly pursuing equitable remedies. In
opposing the motion to dismiss, Allottees stated that their
complaint “does not seek compensation for a taking” but rather
“seeks to preserve the Allottees’ uniquely valuable Winters
water rights.” On appeal, Allottees describe their takings claim
as seeking a declaration “voiding” the Statement of Findings,
“thereby honoring the repeal of the Act” and restoring
Allottees’ Winters rights. Appellant Br. 39. The declaration
they seek would function as an injunction and therefore must
be assessed by equitable standards.
Because Allottees seek equitable relief for their takings
claim, they were required to make at least some argument as to
why remedies at law would be inadequate to compensate them.
To the extent a plaintiff can ever seek equitable relief for a
taking by the federal government, we have suggested this
remedy is available only if “the monetary compensation
available through the Tucker Act remedy is so inadequate that
the plaintiff would not be justly compensated for the seizure of
his property by the United States.” Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir.,
Off. of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
But cf. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173 (“Equitable relief was not
available because monetary relief was under the Tucker Act.”).
We need not decide whether the narrow exception described in
Transohio survives the Supreme Court’s decision in Knick
because nothing in the Allottees’ complaint or their opposition
to the motion to dismiss even suggests that compensation
would be an inadequate remedy.5 Allottees’ takings claim
therefore fails as a matter of law.
5 Allottees maintain the Supreme Court recognized the availability
of declaratory and equitable relief for takings of Indian property
rights in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), and Babbitt v. Youpee,
519 U.S. 234 (1997). Hodel and Babbitt, however, do not squarely
address the question of remedies, and in any event nowhere suggest

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B.
Allottees also allege that publication of the Statement of
Findings violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. To assert
a due process claim, a plaintiff must allege that the government
has deprived him of a protected property interest and that the
procedures used by the government were constitutionally
deficient. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490
U.S. 454, 459–60 (1989). “[A] procedural due process claim
requires the plaintiff to identify the process that is due.” Doe
by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 870 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (per curiam).
If a property deprivation is “the direct consequence” of a
statute, and there is no alleged “defect in the legislative
process,” there is “no basis” for a procedural due process
claim.6 Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985). When
Congress enacts “[g]eneral statutes within the state
power … that affect the person or property of individuals,”
there is no entitlement to notice or an opportunity to be heard.
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,
445 (1915).
that such equitable remedies are available without a showing that
compensation is inadequate. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2176.
6 By contrast, when the government makes individualized
determinations about property rights, the holders of those rights are
generally entitled to procedures, such as notice and an opportunity to
be heard before a neutral decisionmaker. See Londoner v. City and
Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908). There is no
individualized determination or adjudication at issue here.

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The complaint alleges the publication of the Statement of
Findings deprived Allottees of their valuable Winters rights
without due process. The Government does not contest that
Allottees have alleged a deprivation of a protected property
interest. Allottees have failed, however, to plausibly allege that
the process they received was constitutionally defective.
The complaint states only that Allottees were deprived of
their Winters water rights “without notice or due process of
law.” Compl. ¶ 213. But the Settlement Act provided notice to
Allottees that the waivers of their Winters rights would be
effective once the Secretary published the Statement of
Findings. We agree with the district court that “the legislative
process was the only process to which [Allottees] were
entitled.” Hill v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 699 F. Supp. 3d 1,
28–29 (D.D.C. 2023) (cleaned up). The Statement of Findings
was not an adjudication or administrative determination of
Allottees’ Winters water rights. Rather, the Statement was
published as the “direct consequence” of a duly enacted
statute—literally the due process of a law. Atkins, 472 U.S. at
130. And Allottees do not allege any defects in the legislative
process resulting in the Settlement Act. Id. Therefore, “the
legislative determination provides all the process that is due.”
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982).
Moreover, the complaint identifies no additional notice to
which Allottees were entitled. Doe by Fein, 93 F.3d at 870. On
appeal, Allottees raise arguments that the Government was
required to provide them with some type of personal service
and a hearing before publication of the Statement of Findings.
But these claims are new on appeal and therefore forfeited.
Allottees have failed to state a due process claim.

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C.
Finally, we consider Allottees’ claim that publication of
the Statement of Findings violated the Fifth Amendment’s
equal protection guarantee.
The Supreme Court has long held that the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates equal
protection principles. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636, 638 n.2 (1975). The equal protection guarantee means that
“laws that classify on the basis of race, alienage, or national
origin trigger strict scrutiny and will pass constitutional muster
only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.” United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816, 1828
(2025) (cleaned up). Laws that distinguish between Indians and
non-Indians are not generally subject to strict scrutiny if the
distinction is based on Indians’ status “as members of quasi-
sovereign tribal entities,” and “can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.”
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554–55 (1974).
Allottees claim that the Statement of Findings, by
triggering the Settlement Act’s waiver of their Winters water
rights, impermissibly distinguishes between Indian and non-
Indian water rights holders.7 In particular, the complaint alleges
the Act, once it goes into effect, will benefit non-Indian water
users by protecting them from Indian priority calls, which,
absent the Act, would date back to 1868.
This claim fails out of the gate. The Settlement Act does
not differentiate between Indians and non-Indians, but rather
7 As to Allottees’ argument that their equal protection claim alleges
impingement of a fundamental right, water access, this allegation is
new on appeal and therefore forfeited.

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between property types. Under the Act, the Tribe and allottees
waive their Winters water rights in exchange for the benefits
and water rights conferred in the Act. Settlement Act,
§ 410(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 3109. By contrast, the water rights of
individuals who own fee patented land on the Reservation are
determined by Montana state law and are unaffected by the
terms of the Settlement Act and the Compact. See, e.g., Mont.
Code Ann. § 85-20-901, art. II, § 19; art. III; art. IV, § A.2.c.
The categories drawn in the Compact and ratified in the
Settlement Act are thus threefold: the Tribe, allottees, and fee
patent landowners. But these categories do not map onto tribal
status. While all allottees are tribal members, many of the fee
patent owners are also tribal members. Even if the Act benefits
fee patent holders over allottees, that distinction does not turn
on whether the property holders are Indians because Indians
own both types of property. Allottees therefore fail to state an
equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
So ordered.

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