United States of America, Ex Rel. Mark J. O’connor v. U.s. Cellular Corporation

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 1, 2024 Decided September 26, 2025
No. 23-7041
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. MARK J. O’CONNOR
AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
AND
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
APPELLANTS
v.
U.S. CELLULAR CORPORATION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:20-cv-02070)
Daniel Woofter argued the cause for appellants. With him
on the briefs were Sara M. Lord and Benjamin J. Vernia.
Kwaku A. Akowuah argued the cause for appellees. On the
brief were David W. DeBruin, Frank R. Volpe, Robert J.
Conlan, Shai Berman, and Andrew S. Tulumello.
Tara S. Morrissey, Andrew R. Varcoe, Jeffrey S. Bucholtz,
and Ethan P. Davis were on the brief for amicus curiae the

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Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in
support of appellees.
Before: WILKINS, KATSAS, and RAO, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.
KATSAS, Circuit Judge: This case involves allegations that
United States Cellular Corporation, acting through the
controlled shell company Advantage Spectrum, L.P.,
fraudulently obtained nearly $113 million in bidding credits for
license auctions conducted by the Federal Communications
Commission. The defendants moved to dismiss based on the
public-disclosure bar in the False Claims Act, which generally
prevents relators from pursuing fraud claims based on
substantially the same allegations as ones that have already
been publicly disclosed. According to the defendants, the fraud
alleged here had already been disclosed in various FCC filings
made by Advantage, and the relators’ allegations did not
materially add to the disclosures. The district court agreed with
the defendants and dismissed the case. We reverse.
I
A
The False Claims Act imposes civil liability for various
forms of fraud against the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
A private individual, called a relator, may bring a qui tam
action alleging an FCA violation on behalf of the United States.
Id. § 3730(b). If the relator succeeds, he is entitled to a share
of the damages recovered and reasonable expenses. Id.
§ 3730(d)(2).
The public-disclosure bar restricts qui tam actions based
on fraud that has already been publicly disclosed. As amended

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in 2010, the bar requires dismissal of a qui tam case “if
substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in
the action” have been “publicly disclosed” through one of three
enumerated channels: (i) “a Federal criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is
a party;” (ii) “a congressional, Government Accountability
Office, or other Federal report, hearing, audit, or
investigation;” or (iii) “the news media.” 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). But even if there has been such a prior
disclosure, the bar does not apply if the relator qualifies as an
“original source of the information.” Id. The FCA defines the
term “original source” to include two categories of individuals.
Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B). One such category is any individual “who
has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before
filing” the qui tam action. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B)(2).
B
The FCC auctions licenses to transmit information at
specified frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum. 47
U.S.C. § 309(j)(1). In these auctions, it may give bidding
credits to small businesses. Id. § 309(j)(4)(D).
Regulations establish the credit scheme. 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.2110(f) (2012).1 The availability and amount of any credit
depends on the applicant’s revenue plus the revenue of other
entities that control or have another “attributable material
relationship” to the applicant. Id. § 1.2110(b)(1)(i). Control
includes de facto control, which turns on whether the allegedly
controlling entity appoints a majority of the applicant’s board
of directors, has authority to appoint its senior executives, or
1 All citations in this opinion are to regulations that were in
effect in 2014 and 2015, when the disputed events took place.

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plays an integral role in its management. Id. § 1.2110(c)(2)(i).
An “attributable material relationship” exists if the applicant
agrees to lease at least “25 percent of the spectrum capacity” of
any license to another company. Id. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A).
An “unjust-enrichment rule” applies to any small business
that secures a bid credit and then, within five years of obtaining
its license, seeks to transfer control of it to another entity that
is ineligible for the credit. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2111(d). In that case,
the licensee must return all or part of the credit, depending on
how much time has passed since the auction. See id.
At various times, applicants and licensees must certify
their eligibility for bid credits. Before an auction, prospective
bidders must do so on a short-form application called FCC
Form 175. After the auction, successful bidders must do so on
a long-form application called FCC Form 601. Once the FCC
grants a license, the licensee must file annual reports disclosing
anything that might impact its continuing eligibility for the
credit. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(n).
C
This case involves alleged fraud in connection with
spectrum licenses obtained by Advantage Spectrum, L.P. in an
auction conducted by the FCC between November 2014 and
January 2015. The core allegation is that U.S. Cellular
controlled and had an attributable material relationship with
Advantage, which these companies concealed from the FCC.
Because U.S. Cellular is one of the largest telecommunications
companies in the country, such control or relationships would
have disqualified Advantage from receiving any bidding
credits as a small business.
William Vail, a retired telecommunications employee,
registered Advantage as a limited partnership in August 2014,

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some three months after the FCC announced an upcoming
auction of more than 1,600 spectrum licenses. Vail listed
himself, acting through two corporate intermediaries, as the
general partner of Advantage. Advantage registered for the
auction and claimed a bidding credit as a small business. When
the auction closed, Advantage was selected to receive 124
spectrum licenses. It paid about $338 million for the licenses
and received nearly $113 million in bid credits. In its short-
form license application, its long-form application, and its
annual FCC reports, Advantage certified that Vail had de facto
and de jure control of Advantage and that no other entity or
individual, except the two listed corporate intermediaries, had
such control. Advantage also certified that it had disclosed all
agreements and arrangements relevant to its claimed bid credit.
Relators Mark O’Connor and Sara Leibman filed this
False Claims Act case against U.S. Cellular, Advantage, related
corporate entities, and one individual. They alleged that
Advantage, in its FCC filings, fraudulently misrepresented and
concealed relationships with U.S. Cellular that disqualified
Advantage from receiving the bid credits. The relators focused
on certifications that Vail alone controlled Advantage and that
Advantage had disclosed all agreements relevant to its claimed
status as a small business. According to the relators, U.S.
Cellular exercised at least de facto control over Advantage, and
the two companies had an undisclosed agreement for U.S.
Cellular to acquire Advantage’s spectrum licenses after the
close of the unjust-enrichment period. And as a result of that
alleged control and agreement, U.S. Cellular’s substantial
revenue was attributable to Advantage and easily disqualified
it from receiving any bid credits.
The district court dismissed the case without prejudice
based on the public-disclosure bar. United States ex rel.
O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular Corp., No. 20-cv-2070, 2022 WL

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971290 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2022). After the relators amended
their complaint, the district court again dismissed the case
based on the public-disclosure bar, this time with prejudice.
United States ex rel. O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular Corp., No. 20-
cv-2070, 2023 WL 2424605 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2023).
II
This Court reviews de novo dismissals for failure to state
a claim. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Int’l Dev. Fin.
Corp., 77 F.4th 679, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Because the FCA
is an antifraud statute, relators must satisfy both the
“plausibility” standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
and the heightened “particularity” standard of Rule 9. United
States ex rel. Vt. Nat’l Tel. Co. v. Northstar Wireless, LLC, 34
F.4th 29, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Under Rule 8, the complaint
must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 570 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Under Rule 9, the
complaint “must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
The sole question before us is whether the FCA’s public-
disclosure bar applies to this case. As reformulated in 2010, it
is an affirmative defense. See United States ex rel. O’Connor
v. USCC Wireless Inv., Inc., 128 F.4th 276, 284 (D.C. Cir.
2025) (King Street). A complaint need not “anticipate and
negate” affirmative defenses. Cunningham v. Cornell Univ.,
604 U.S. 693, 702 (2025) (cleaned up). But a defendant may
secure dismissal by showing that facts supporting a defense
“are clear from the face of the complaint.” King Street, 128
F.4th at 285 (quoting de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714
F.3d 591, 608 (D.C. Cir. 2013)); see also 5 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1277 (4th ed. 2025). In

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considering such a defense, we also may review documents that
are either incorporated by reference into the complaint or
judicially noticeable. See Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508
F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
This case bears many similarities to King Street. That case
involved allegations by O’Connor and Leibman that U.S.
Cellular had created a sham small business to fraudulently
obtain bidding credits in another FCC spectrum auction. See
128 F.4th at 282–83. It also involved a dismissal based on the
public-disclosure bar. See id. at 283. But in King Street, the
prior disclosures had been made in earlier qui tam litigation,
where other relators sketched out the relevant fraud allegations
in significant detail. See id. at 282. Here, in contrast, the
defendants contend that the prior disclosures of fraud were
made in the very FCC filings through which the putative small
business obtained and retained its bidding credits. As
explained below, we do not think that those filings support
dismissal at this early stage of the case.
A
The public-disclosure bar requires that “substantially the
same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action” were
“publicly disclosed” through one of three specified channels of
communication. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). We conclude that
the prior disclosures here occurred in one of the specified
public channels, but we reserve judgment on whether the
complaint makes “substantially the same” fraud allegations.
1
To trigger the bar, the disclosure must be made “(i) in a
Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the
Government or its agent is a party; (ii) in a congressional,
Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report,

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hearing, audit, or investigation; or (iii) [in] the news media.”
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The defendants invoke various
filings made by Advantage in the FCC licensing proceedings.
We conclude that those proceedings qualify as an “other
Federal … hearing” within the meaning of romanette (ii).
The parties agree that such a hearing encompasses
informal proceedings decided on the basis of written
submissions. So do we. In United States v. Florida East Coast
Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), the Supreme Court held that
the term “hearing,” as used in the Administrative Procedure
Act, encompasses such informal proceedings. Specifically, the
Court held that an APA hearing “does not necessarily embrace
either the right to present evidence orally and to cross-examine
opposing witnesses, or the right to present oral argument to the
agency’s decisionmaker.” Id. at 240. Applying that decision,
this Court likewise held that the term “hearing,” as used in the
pre-2010 version of the public-disclosure bar, extends to
“informal, ‘paper’ proceedings.” United States ex rel.
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 652 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (quoting Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. at 239).
The pre-2010 version of the bar covered disclosures made in
(i) a “criminal, civil, or administrative hearing” and (ii) a
“congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation.” Pub. L. 99-562
§ 3, 100 Stat. 3153, 3157 (1986). We see no reason to conclude
that the 2010 amendments, in restricting the first prong of the
statute to federal hearings in which the government is a party,
somehow also restricted covered hearings to formal
proceedings with live testimony.
The relators propose two limiting constructions of
romanette (ii). First, they contend that the phrase “report,
hearing, audit, or investigation” connotes investigatory
proceedings designed to produce information for the

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government. We agree that romanette (ii) covers “a wide array
of investigatory processes.” United States v. Allergan, 46 F.4th
991, 998 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Silbersher v. Valeant
Pharms., Int’l, 89 F.4th 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2024). But the
proceedings here are investigatory in this sense, as the FCC
requires the reports and applications at issue to gather
information about whether companies qualify for spectrum
licenses and bid credits. Second, invoking romanette (i), the
relators propose that romanette (ii) must be limited to
proceedings that are not “criminal, civil, or administrative” in
nature. But the text of romanette (ii) suggests no such limit.
And despite the relators’ argument to the contrary, this
narrowing construction is unnecessary to avoid reducing
romanette (i) to surplusage. Assuming romanette (ii) generally
covers investigatory proceedings, whether or not
administrative, it still might not cover contested “adversarial”
proceedings in which the government is a party, which is the
heartland of romanette (i). See Silbersher, 89 F.4th at 1164–
66. Putting aside this concern about surplusage, we may
confidently construe romanette (ii) to cover administrative
investigatory proceedings, consistent with its plain terms.2
2
In determining whether the public-disclosure bar applies,
we must also consider whether the complaint raises
“substantially the same allegations” of fraud as what was
previously disclosed. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The “critical
inquiry” under this standard is “whether the government had
2 To trigger the public-disclosure bar, the defendants also cite a
2015 filing made by U.S. Cellular with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It discloses nothing of substance beyond what appears
in the relevant FCC filings. Accordingly, we need not decide
whether the SEC filing was made in a “Federal report, hearing, audit,
or investigation” covered by the public-disclosure bar.

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enough information to investigate the case or whether the
information could at least have alerted law-enforcement
authorities to the likelihood of wrongdoing.” King Street, 128
F.4th at 285 (cleaned up). Here, the dispute centers around bid
credits obtained by Advantage in an FCC spectrum auction. As
noted above, the complaint alleges that Advantage made
fraudulent misrepresentations regarding control and concealed
agreements that disqualified it from receiving the credits.
While the defendants’ primary argument about whether the
government had enough public information to investigate
leaves us wanting, we assume without deciding that the prior
public disclosures alleged substantially the same fraud as the
complaint.
The defendants contend that this fraud was adequately
disclosed in Advantage’s own FCC filings. On the law, they
stress that public disclosures need not “irrefutably prove a case
of fraud” in order to trigger the bar. See United States ex rel.
Settlemire v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 919 (D.C. Cir.
1999). On the facts, they stress that Advantage’s FCC filings
“made plain the degree of [U.S. Cellular’s] influence over
Advantage.” Appellees’ Br. at 27. In particular, the filings
revealed that U.S. Cellular owned 90 percent of Advantage,
loaned Advantage substantially all of the money to pay for its
licenses, and had input into Advantage’s business decisions.
Moreover, they disclosed protocols requiring Vail to work for
an individual tied to U.S. Cellular and to bid on licenses that
overlapped with its coverage areas. According to the
defendants, this triggered the bar because it would have
“enable[d] the government to adequately investigate the case
and make a decision whether to prosecute” any fraud claim.
United States ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 826
F.3d 466, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

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There are reasons to doubt whether the publicly available
information and disclosures are suggestive of the fraud alleged
in the complaint. For one thing, the defendants’ account
overlooks important features of the FCC preference scheme.
This scheme seeks to “encourage large companies to invest in”
small businesses and other preferred bidders, in light of the
high capital costs for licensees to provide reliable signal
coverage. See In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the
Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C. Rcd.
5532 ¶¶ 10, 15 (1994). And U.S. Cellular’s legal status as
Advantage’s limited partner, far from suggesting the exercise
of day-to-day control, indicated precisely the opposite. See
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.03 cmt. e(2) (A.L.I. 2006).
In short, U.S. Cellular’s role as an investor and limited partner
would not have disqualified Advantage from receiving bid
credits so long as U.S. Cellular neither controlled Advantage
nor secured an agreement to take over its licenses. The public
disclosures cited by the defendants are thus fully consistent
with the scheme operating lawfully and as intended.
Furthermore, the representations made by Advantage
were unequivocal. It told the FCC that Vail had “both de jure
and de facto control” of Advantage and that “[n]o other
individual or entity ha[d] a controlling interest” in Advantage.
J.A. 262. Moreover, Advantage certified that, except as
specifically disclosed in its long-form application, it had
“entered into no partnerships, joint venture, consortia or other
agreements, arrangements or understandings of any kind with
third parties relating to the licenses being auctioned.” Id. at
513. These filings raise no strong inference that Advantage
made fraudulent misrepresentations or concealed information
about who controlled it or about agreements involving the
licenses. And it is hardly surprising that Advantage’s own FCC
filings made no strong case that Advantage and its partners may
have been defrauding the government.

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Despite these considerations, we do not decide that
Advantage’s prior FCC disclosures sufficiently disclosed
“substantially the same” fraud as the one alleged in the
complaint. In concluding that the public-disclosure bar does
not apply, we rest on a narrower ground: Even if the fraud
alleged was substantially the same as what had already been
disclosed in the FCC filings, the relators still materially added
to the publicly available information and allegations. As we
now explain, that material contribution, combined with other
elements set forth in the complaint, adequately allege that the
original-source exception applies in this case.
B
Regardless of any prior disclosures, the public-disclosure
bar is inapplicable if the relator qualifies as an “original source
of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). As relevant
here, a relator so qualifies if he “has knowledge that is
independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions” and has “voluntarily provided” it to
the Government before filing the qui tam action. Id.
§ 3730(e)(4)(B)(2). The relator bears the burden of pleading
and proving these elements because original-source status
serves as “an exception to the public-disclosure bar,” and
relators “are also best situated to know the facts relevant to
whether they qualify.” King Street, 128 F.4th at 287. The
relator can meet this burden by pointing to allegations in its
complaint or, if the defendant raises the public-disclosure
defense in a motion to dismiss, by seeking leave to amend the
complaint. Here, the relators are content to stand on the
operative complaint.
1
The complaint adequately alleges facts that materially add
to information already publicly disclosed.

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At first glance, establishing that a complaint alleges
“substantially the same” fraud as one previously disclosed,
which is an essential element of the public-disclosure bar,
might seem to negate any argument that the relator’s
allegations “materially add[]” to prior disclosures, which is an
essential element of the second prong of the original-source
exception. The overlap in these inquiries led one court of
appeals to conclude as a matter of law that, if the substantial-
sameness requirement is met, the materially-adding
requirement cannot be. Cause of Action v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
815 F.3d 267, 283 (7th Cir. 2016). But that analysis would
eliminate the second prong of the original-source exception,
which defines the term “original source” to include any
individual “(2) who has knowledge that is independent of and
materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or
transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information
to the Government before filing an action under” the FCA
section authorizing qui tam cases. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(B)(2) (emphasis added). Given the enumeration
of separate prongs of the defense and the relative complexity
of the second prong, reducing the second prong to surplusage
cannot be right, as several other courts of appeals have
recognized. See United States ex rel. Maur v. Hage-Korban,
981 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2020); United States ex rel. Reed
v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d 729, 757 (10th Cir. 2019);
United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827
F.3d 201, 211–12 (1st Cir. 2016). In other words, even if a
complaint alleges a fraud “substantially the same” as one
previously disclosed, the allegations might still “materially
add” to the publicly available information.
In King Street, we adopted a standard for “materially adds”
that is demanding yet flexible enough to avoid any surplusage
problem. As we explained, “[s]omething is material if it is
likely to influence a reasonable person’s behavior.” 128 F.4th

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at 288. So a relator satisfies the “materially adds” requirement
if his information “‘is sufficiently significant or essential’ to
influence the government’s decision to prosecute” a False
Claims Act case. Id. at 289 (quoting Winkelman, 827 F.3d at
211); see also Maur, 981 F.3d at 527; Reed, 923 F.3d at 757.
Under this standard, merely adding “detail or color to
previously disclosed elements of an alleged scheme” is not
enough. See King Street, 128 F.4th at 289 (quoting Reed, 923
F.3d at 757). Nor is merely providing “background
information” or additional “specific examples” of a disclosed
fraud. See Reed, 923 F.3d at 757, 760; Winkelman, 827 F.3d at
212. But providing information “that adds in a significant way
to the essential factual background” of the fraud can sometimes
be enough. See United States ex rel. Moore & Co. v. Majestic
Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2016).
The relators flag several kinds of allegations that they say
materially add to information previously disclosed to the FCC.
We agree as to two related categories. The first involves
evidence that Advantage never functioned as an independent
business, which materially advances the claim that U.S.
Cellular exercised de facto control over Advantage. The
second involves the related allegation that Advantage secretly
agreed to transfer its licenses to U.S. Cellular at the close of the
unjust-enrichment period.
First, the relators identified significant new evidence that
Advantage never functioned as an independent business. In
particular, they allege that in the six years since the licenses
were awarded, Advantage has never had a legitimate place of
business, employed anyone, or conducted itself in any way as
if it were a business. For example, according to the complaint:
Advantage has neither a management committee nor any
management agreement. J.A. 321. It occupies no office space
and has neither a website nor a working phone number. Id. at

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321–22. Its listed addresses consist of “an unoccupied interior
room in a condo complex, a storefront in a strip mall, and a
home address in a retirement community.” Id. at 322. Its listed
phone numbers are “associated either with Vail or his family
members.” Id. Vail himself is a retiree who has neither the
intention nor the experience to run a wireless company. Id. at
308. He purports to run Advantage from his home in a Florida
retirement community. Id. at 286, 321–22. This evidence,
none of which was disclosed in the public documents, suggests
that Advantage exists only on paper and that Vail, who claims
to manage its day-to-day operations, acts as a puppet for U.S.
Cellular. And all of this substantially strengthens the case that
U.S. Cellular exercised de facto control over Advantage.3
Second, the relators allege that Advantage had made an
undisclosed agreement to transfer the licenses to U.S. Cellular
through a merger after the unjust-enrichment period had ended.
Any such agreement would have independently disqualified
Advantage from receiving the bid credits; no such agreement
3 To conclude that this information was immaterial, the district
court relied on the government’s decision not to intervene in this
case. But the government’s decision not to pursue an enforcement
action “involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors
which are peculiarly within its expertise,” including resource and
policy considerations that may warrant declining to pursue even
meritorious claims. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
These considerations also may lead the government to take a wait-
and-see approach, declining initially to intervene but requiring the
relators to provide litigation updates and potentially intervening later
for good cause. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). For these reasons, the
government’s discretionary decision not to intervene says very little
about the materiality of the relators’ new information. And in any
event, the court must decide the materiality question for itself: It
should not draw an inference of immateriality based on a government
decision declining intervention, just as it would not draw an
inference of materiality based on a government decision to intervene.

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has been publicly disclosed; and Advantage expressly
disavowed the existence of any such agreement to the FCC.
J.A. 513. The defendants object that the facts alleged in the
complaint do not plausibly suggest an undisclosed agreement.
The relators might ultimately fail to prove such an agreement,
but they have at least plausibly alleged one. According to the
complaint, Advantage entirely failed to build up a
telecommunications company capable of functioning
independent of U.S. Cellular. Nor did it even establish a
convincing façade, such as a furnished office or a working
phone number, to maintain itself as a long-term front company.
In Northstar Wireless, we held that the relator had plausibly
alleged undisclosed agreements to “transfer spectrum rights”
because the behavior of the alleged small businesses made
“little sense” unless they had “agreed in advance” that a bigger
company “would ultimately control the licenses won at
auction.” See 34 F.4th at 39. So too here.
2
Lastly, the relators sufficiently allege the other elements of
the original-source exception—that their knowledge of this
information was “independent” of any publicly disclosed items
and that they “voluntarily provided the information to the
Government” before filing their complaint. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(B)(2); see J.A. 292. The relators’ allegation of
independent knowledge is plausible given the extent to which
their allegations materially add to previously disclosed
information. And the relators’ statement that they voluntarily
provided the information to the government before filing this
case makes a straightforward allegation of historical fact. Of
course, our conclusion that the relators have adequately
pleaded such factual issues does not foreclose their further
litigation on summary judgment or at trial.

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III
Because the relators have adequately alleged that they
qualify as original sources, we reverse the dismissal of this case
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.

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